The Trail Of Diplomacy

PART FOUR — RENEWAL OF THE VENEZUELAN CLAIM

CHAPTER 15

The Allegations of Mallet-Prevost

It was clear that Venezuela had accepted the 1899 Award as a final settlement of the border dispute. Even as late as 1941, as stated earlier, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs had agreed that the frontier with British Guiana was well defined and was a closed issue.

However, in February 1944, forty-five years after the Arbitral Award, Severo Mallet-Prevost, one of the four lawyers who had appeared for Venezuela before the Arbitral Tribunal, wrote a memorandum in which, for the first time, he attacked the Award on the alleged grounds that it was the result of a political deal between Great Britain and Russia. However, he refused to make the memorandum public and instructed that it should be published until after his death. He added that publication of the memorandum must only be done at the discretion of his associate, Dr. Otto Shoenrich, a junior partner of his law firm. It must be noted that Mallet-Prevost wrote his memorandum just one month after he was awarded the highest Venezuelan national award, the Order of the Liberator, for his work on behalf of Venezuela before the Arbitral Tribunal.

Mallet-Prevost eventually died on the 12 December 1948, and in July 1949 Dr. Shoenrich published the memorandum. By this time all the other persons who participated in the case in 1899 had all long died, and those whom he attacked in his statement could no longer refute the charges that he made against them.

A. THE MALLET-PREVOST MEMORANDUM

The memorandum of Mallet-Prevost, dated 8 February 1944, was published in the American Journal of International Law, Volume 43, Number 3, of July 1949. It stated:

Justice Brewer and I sailed for Europe in January 1899 in order to attend the first meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal which was to meet in Paris for the purpose of deciding the boundary between Venezuela and Great Britain. The terms of the Protocol which had been signed between Great Britain and Venezuela required that the Tribunal should meet at that time. However, as it was found inconvenient for all those who should be connected with the arbitration to meet on that date it was decided to hold merely a preliminary meeting, so as to comply with the terms of the Protocol, and then adjourn to a more convenient date.

Before going to Paris, Justice Brewer and I stopped in London. While there Mr. Henry White, Charge d'Affaires for the United States, gave us a small dinner to which Lord Chief Justice Russell was invited. I sat next to Lord Russell and, in the course of conversation, ventured to express the opinion that international arbitrations should base their decisions exclusively on legal grounds.

Lord Russell immediately responded saying: "I entirely disagree with you. I think that international arbitrations should be conducted on broader lines, and that they should take into consideration questions of international policy." From that moment I knew that we could not count upon Lord Russell to decide the boundary question on the basis of strict rights.

When we assembled in Paris the following June, I met Lord Collins for the first time. During the speeches by Sir Richard Webster, the Attorney General, and by myself (the two of which consumed 26 days) it was quite obvious that Lord Collins was sincerely interested in getting at the full facts of the case and in ascertaining the law applicable to those facts. He, of course, gave no indication as to how he might vote on the subject, but his whole attitude and the numerous questions which he asked were critical of the British contentions and gave the impression that he was leaning toward the side of Venezuela.

After Sir Richard Webster and I had concluded our speeches, the Tribunal adjourned for a short two weeks' holiday. The two British Arbitrators returned to England and took Mr. (de) Martens with them.

When we resumed our sittings at the end of the recess, the change in Lord Collins was noticeable. He asked very few questions, and his attitude was certainly different from what it had been. It looked to us (by which I mean the counsel for Venezuela) as though something must have happened in London to bring about the change.

When all the speeches had been concluded in the month of August or early September, the court adjourned so as to allow the arbitrators to confer and render their decision. Several days passed while we anxiously waited, but one afternoon I received a message from Justice Brewer saying that he and Justice Fuller would like to speak with me and asking me to meet them at their hotel. I immediately went there.

When I was shown into the apartment where the two American arbitrators were waiting for me, Justice Brewer arose and said quite excitedly:

"Mallet-Prevost, it is useless any longer to keep up this farce pretending that we are judges and that you are counsel. The Chief (Fuller) and I have decided to disclose to you confidentially just what has passed. Martens has been to see us. He informs us that Russell and Collins are ready to decide in favor of the Schomburgk Line, which starting from Point Barima on the coast would give Great Britain the control of the main mouth of the Orinoco; and that if we insist on starting the line on the coast at the Moruca River he will side with the British and approve the Schomburgk Line as the true boundary.

"However, he added that he, Martens, is anxious to have a unanimous decision; and if we will agree to accept the line which he proposes, he will secure the acquiescence of Lord Russell and Lord Collins and so make the decision unanimous.

"What Martens then proposed was that the line on the coast should start at some distance south-east of Point Barima so as to give Venezuela control of the Orinoco mouth; and that the line should connect with the Schomburgk Line at some distance in the interior leaving to Venezuela the control of the Orinoco mouth and some 5000 square miles of territory around the mouth.

"That is what Martens has proposed. The Chief and I are of the opinion that the boundary on the coast should start at the Moruca River. The question for us to decide is as to whether we shall agree to Martens' proposal or whether we shall file dissenting opinions. Under these circumstances, the Chief and I have decided that we must consult you, and I now state to you that we are prepared to follow whichever of the two courses you wish us to do."

From what Justice Brewer had just said, and from the change which we had all noticed in Lord Collins, I became convinced and still believe that during Martens' visit to England, a deal had been concluded between Russia and Great Britain to decide the case along the lines suggested by Martens and that pressure to that end had in some way been exerted on Collins to follow that course.

I naturally felt that the responsibility which I was asked to shoulder was greater than I could alone bear. I so stated to the two arbitrators and I asked for permission to consult General Harrison. This they gave and I immediately went to General Harrison's apartment to confer on the subject.

After disclosing to General Harrison what had just passed, he rose in indignation and pacing the floor, described the action of Great Britain and Russia in terms which it is needless for me to repeat. His first reaction was to ask Fuller and Brewer to file dissenting opinions, but, after cooling down and considering the matter from a practical standpoint, he said: "Mallet-Prevost, if it should ever be known that we had it in our power to save for Venezuela the mouth of the Orinoco and failed to do so, we should never be forgiven. What Martens proposes is iniquitous but I see nothing for Fuller and Brewer to do but to agree."

I concurred with General Harrison and so advised Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer. The decision which was accordingly rendered was unanimous, but while it gave to Venezuela the most important strategic point at issue, it was unjust to Venezuela and deprived her of very extensive territory to which, in my opinion, Great Britain had not the shadow of a right.

B. CLIFTON CHILD'S EXAMINATION OF MALLET-PREVOST'S ALLEGATIONS

These allegations made by Mallet-Prevost were carefully examined in an article by the American historian, Clifton Child in October 1950 in Volume 44, Number 4 of the American Journal of International Law.

Child, a former Commonwealth Fund Fellow at the University of Wisconsin, consulted all the volumes in the British Foreign Office, the verbatim records of the Tribunal, as well as the dispatches passing between London, Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and New York during the relevant period. The conclusion which he drew from this study was that there was "not a single document which, by the widest stretch of the imagination, could be considered to indicate a deal between Great Britain and Russia of the sort suspected by Mr. Mallet-Prevost".

The following is the text of Child's article:

THE VENEZUELA-BRITISH GUIANA BOUNDARY ARBITRATION OF 1899

In his note on "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute," (this JOURNAL, Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 528-680), Judge Otto Schoenrich publishes a memorandum by the late Severo Mallet-Prevost which, if it were the only evidence upon which the fairness of the arbitration of 1899 could be judged, would bring the justice of the award seriously into question. Fortunately, however, it is not necessary to rely either upon the recollections of Mr. Mallet-Prevost or upon the construction placed upon these and other facts relating to the boundary dispute by Judge Schoenrich in order to learn the truth of how the Tribunal came to make its award. There are the voluminous files of the British Foreign Office on the arbitration to which reference may be made and there is the verbatim record of the Tribunal, taken down by six shorthand writers, printed day by day as the Tribunal sat, and then issued in 54 parts. There are also the files-often most informative-of contemporary newspapers (for the arbitration took place at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the watchful eye of the press).

It was perhaps only to be expected that some day, after turning the matter over in his mind for so long, Mr. Mallet-Prevost would eventually produce a theory to justify the attack which he and General Harrison, the senior Counsel for Venezuela, launched upon the Tribunal immediately after the award was announced on October 3, 1899. On that occasion Mr. Mallet-Prevost and General Harrison made a statement to Reuter's correspondent which, after claiming "victory" for Venezuela in terms which will be referred to later in this paper, concluded as follows:

The President of the Tribunal . . . had in his closing address today commented on the unanimity of the present judgment and referred to it as a proof of the success of the arbitration. It did not, however, require much intelligence to penetrate behind this superficial statement and see that the line drawn was a line of compromise and not a line of right. If the British contention had been right, the line should have been drawn much further west. If it had been wrong, then it should have been drawn much further east. There was nothing in the history of the controversy, nor in fact in the legal principle involved, which could adequately explain why the line should be drawn as it was now found. So long as arbitration was to be conducted on such principles it could not be regarded as a success, at least by those who believed that arbitration would result in an admission of legal rights and not in compromises really diplomatic in their character. Venezuela had gained much, but she was entitled to much more, and if the arbitrators were unanimous it must be because their failure to agree would have confirmed Great Britain in the possession of even more territory. [The Times (London), Oct. 4, 1899]

In view of the charges which have now been ventilated in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's memorandum, the language of this attack is significant. For it will be noted that, although he and General Harrison did not spare the Tribunal, nor, indeed, the two American judges who were members of it, the only suggestion of impropriety which they made in connection with the award was that it was essentially a compromise, rather than the admission of right on the part of one side or the other, and that it consequently deprived Venezuela of territory to which her Counsel (naturally enough) believed her to be legally entitled.

There was no complaint that this compromise resulted from undue pressure upon the judges by the Russian President of the Tribunal, M. de Martens, or from a "deal" between Russia and Great Britain, as alleged in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's memorandum. Nor was there any appeal to the American judges, as there might reasonably have been, if Mr. Mallet-Prevost's present charge is true, to enter a protest against the false position in which they had supposedly been placed by the President of the Tribunal and to let it be known that, if they had concurred in the unanimous award of the Tribunal, they had done so against their own better judgments. In fact, apart from the resentment which the Counsel for Venezuela apparently felt against the verdict, there were none of the elements of the story as Mr. Mallet-Prevost now tells it - a circumstance which makes it tempting to assume that, in nursing his grievance against the Tribunal through the years, Mr. Mallet-Prevost allowed his imagination to supply a number of details which were missing from the statement which he and General Harrison made in 1899.

This was not the only extent to which the picture apparently changed in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's mind between 1899 and 1944, when he dictated his statement; and thus, before proceeding to examine his principal allegation regarding the "deal" between Great Britain and Russia, it becomes necessary to consider some of the major errors which he allowed to creep into the story and, above all, to call attention to the tricks which his memory apparently played with the facts which he adduces in support of his statement.

The first error in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's account relates to the role of Lord Chief Justice Russell, one of the British judges, in the arbitration. After recording the conversation which he had with Lord Russell at dinner in January, 1899, Mr. Mallet-Prevost observes that, from that moment, he knew that he "could not count upon Lord Russell to decide the boundary question on the basis of strict rights." The fact is, however, that, in January, 1899, when Mr. Mallet-Prevost dined with him, the Lord Chief Justice was in no way connected with the boundary dispute and had no prospect of being involved in the arbitration. At that time the arbitrators were M. de Martens, Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Brewer, Lord Justice Collins and Lord Herschel - as provided for in Article II of the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of February 2, 1897. As the first British arbitrator nominated by the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council, again in accordance with Article II of the Treaty, Lord Herschel was, in January, 1899, actively concerned with the preliminaries of the arbitration, although he was prevented by other business (as was Chief Justice Fuller) from attending the brief and formal first meeting of the Tribunal on January 25. And it was only with his sudden death, after a fall in the street in Washington, D C. on March 1, 1899 (i.e., two months after Mr. Mallet-Prevost's conversation with Lord Russell), that it became necessary to bring in another arbitrator to replace him. It was then, and only then, that Lord Russell became involved in the arbitration, and it is consequently sheer nonsense for Mr. Mallet-Provost to suggest that, from the moment when he dined with the Lord Chief Justice in January, he knew that he could not count upon the latter to be fair, and for Judge Schoenrich to adduce this "circumstance" as having led Mr. Mallet-Prevost to the opinion that a "deal" was concluded behind the scenes between Great Britain and Russia.

In the case of Lord Justice Collins, the other British arbitrator, Mr. Mallet-Prevost's memory seems to have been equally at fault. Of Lord Justice Collins Mr. Mallet-Prevost says that, at first, "his whole attitude and the numerous questions which he asked were critical of the British contentions and gave the impression that he was leaning toward the side of Venezuela"; and that, after the "short two weeks holiday" of the Tribunal (when he and Lord Russell allegedly took the President of the Tribunal with them to England and when the "deal" between Great Britain and Russia was allegedly concluded) the "change in [him] was noticeable," i.e., "he asked very few questions and his whole attitude was entirely different from what it had been."

Now, as Mr. Mallet-Prevost must have known in 1899, even though he apparently overlooked the fact later, every word spoken by Lord Justice Collins as long as he sat on the Tribunal, and every word spoken by every other judge and counsel participating in the arbitration, was entered in the verbatim record which was printed at the end of each day's proceedings; so that, had Mr. Mallet-Prevost checked his statement against the record, the following facts could not possibly have escaped his notice:

1. Taking his recorded remarks as a whole, Lord Justice Coffins gave no tangible indication that he was ''leaning toward the side of Venezuela" or, indeed, toward the side of Great Britain, either before or after the crucial recess. He allowed Lord Russell to do the greater part of the questioning during Sir Richard Webster's opening speech for Great Britain (June 15-July 18). He followed Mr. Mallet-Prevost with a number of critical questions and observations during the latter's opening speech for Venezuela (July 21-August 10), mildly rebuking him on July 24 for the manner in which he presented his evidence. He gave the same alert attention to the ensuing speeches (Mr. Soley, August 12-29; Sir Robert Reid, August 30-September 4; Mr. G. R. Askwith, September 5-7; General Tracy, September 7-15; Sir Richard Webster, September 15-19; and General Harrison, September 19-27). He questioned the British Counsel, Sir Robert Reid and Mr. Askwith, as frequently as he questioned General Tracy, with whom he had long exchanges on September 12 over the latter's interpretation of the Treaty of Munster. Both he and Lord Russell continued to put searching questions to Sir Richard Webster during the latter's summing up. On the other hand, his interruptions during General Harrison's final speech were on the whole not unhelpful to the latter in rounding off the case for Venezuela.

2. Lord Justice Collins' questions and interjections varied in number from 0 to 30 per session before the recess, except on July 31 and August 3, when they numbered 36 and 72 respectively (during Mr. Mallet-Prevost's own speech). They varied from 0 to 29 per session after the recess, the total reaching 29 during the first session after the recess, when the change in him would presumably have been most noticeable had he suddenly become ''taciturn and listless" (as Judge Schoenrich puts it).

3. After the recess, as indeed before, Lord Justice Collins tended to ask as many questions as Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer, who were presumably not "taciturn and listless."

Apart from these errors in regard to the roles of Lord Russell and Lord Justice Collins, there are minor misstatements of fact in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's narrative which also show how badly his memory must have served him. For instance, he states that after he and Sir Richard Webster had concluded their speeches "the Tribunal adjourned for a short two weeks holiday." Now had he deemed it worth his while to refresh his recollection by reference to the printed record, Mr. Mallet-Prevost would have been reminded that the Tribunal did not adjourn after hearing Sir Richard Webster and himself, but went straight on to hear the "argument" of Mr. Soley. It was then, in the very middle of Mr. Soley's "argument", that the Tribunal did adjourn, but only for nine days (August 16-25), and not for "two weeks", as stated by Mr. Mallet-Prevost. (This was only one of the Tribunal's ten adjournments, but as it was the longest, although not by very much, we must assume that it was the one which Mr. Mallet-Prevost had in mind.)

As for Mr. Mallet-Prevost's cardinal allegation that a "deal" was concluded between Great Britain and Russia in 1899 to decide the arbitration in the manner described in his statement, it ought perhaps in the first place to be pointed out that the very suggestion that the British felt it necessary to negotiate such a "deal" implies that by the end of Mr. Mallet-Prevost's speech the proceedings were going so badly for them that they felt that they had to resort to subterfuge in order to make their position more secure. The fact is, however, that Mr. Mallet-Prevost's case gave the British no cause for anxiety. At one stage in his "argument" the President of the Tribunal [at the meeting of July 31] had felt constrained to suggest to him that, in the interest of brevity, he might make certain changes in his method of presenting his evidence; and, after he wound up on August 10, the British Agent, Mr. George W. Buchanan, was able to report to Lord Salisbury that the Tribunal had not, in his opinion, been very profoundly impressed by his performance. He wrote:

The speech which Mr. M-P thus brought to a close has not, I believe, made any real impression on the Tribunal. It has attacked the British position too much in detail, and any success which he may have obtained has been of a purely negative character. [Mr. Buchanan to Lord Salisbury, on 10 August 1899.]

Nor did Mr. Buchanan feel at any time that the case was going badly for Great Britain. On the contrary, he continued to send in optimistic reports throughout the proceedings. At the end of Mr. Soley's speech he thought that the Tribunal was impressed by the fact that Point Barima lay within the British sphere of influence [Mr. Buchanan to Lord Salisbury, 29 August 1899]. He considered that General Tracy, who had "wearied his listeners by reading out a written speech full of endless repetitions," had "made no impression whatsoever on the Tribunal" [Mr. Buchanan to Lord Salisbury, 15 September 1899]; and of General Harrison's final speech he wrote:

In spite of the force and eloquence with which General Harrison has supported the contention that Venezuela as successor to Spain is invested with a prior and paramount title to the territory in dispute, the speech which he has today brought to a close has, I think, failed to make any serious impression on the Tribunal. [Mr. Buchanan to Lord Salisbury, No. 156 of September 27, 1899.]

It is consequently not surprising, perhaps, to find that, in the fifteen bound volumes of British Foreign Office papers relating to the arbitration and in the almost equally voluminous dispatches and telegrams which passed between London and St. Petersburg during this period there is not one single document which by the widest stretch of the imagination could be considered to indicate a "deal" between Great Britain and Russia of the sort suspected by Mr. Mallet-Prevost.

How, in any case, do the steps which were allegedly taken to conclude that "deal" during the crucial recess of the Tribunal in August fit in with what is otherwise known of the movements of the leading figures in the drama? If we are to believe Mr. Mallet-Prevost, "the two British arbitrators returned to England" during the recess "and took Mr. Martens with them." In the case of Lord Russell the first part of this statement is certainly true, for there is confirmation in the London Times of August 18, 1899, Court Circular (page 4), that "the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Russell of Killowen) returned from Paris yesterday to his country house, Tadworth Court, near Epsom." There is, however, no mention of the movements of Lord Justice Collins. Nor is it recorded that M. de Martens accompanied Lord Russell. In fact there is no mention of M. de Martens having visited Great Britain at all, although M. de Martens was very much in the public eye at the time, not only as President of the Tribunal, but as a prominent figure at the First Hague Conference; so that it seems hardly likely that the Times [of 23 August 1899] would have ignored him if it had been known that he was returning with Lord Russell. The absence of any mention of the movements of Lord Justice Collins is also remarkable because there is a full account of the movements of the others concerned in the arbitration. For instance, the Times of August 19 (Court Circular, p. 7) reported that Sir Robert Reid, one of the Counsel for Great Britain, had "returned to his country house at Kingsdown, near Walmer, from Paris"; and the Times of August 18 (Court Circular, p. 4) likewise reported that the Attorney General, Sir Richard Webster, had "left Paris for Switzerland for a short holiday."

But supposing that M. de Martens was taken to England unnoticed by the press in order to participate in a "deal" between Great Britain and Russia, is it likely that the leading British Counsel and the Law Officer of the British Crown most intimately concerned with the handling of the British case - Her Majesty's Attorney General-would have chosen this particular moment to go off in the opposite direction to Switzerland for a holiday? And would Lord Salisbury, who was following the proceedings with the utmost interest, also have chosen this particular time to retire to Walmer Castle in order to be with the Marchioness (then recovering from a serious illness) [The Times, 16 August 1899], so that he was right out of the picture until the Queen summoned him to Osborne on August 24? [The Times, 25 August 1899].

Had Mr. Mallet-Prevost reflected for a moment upon the state of relations between Great Britain and Russia in the summer of 1899 he must inevitably have realized how difficult, if not impossible, from a political point of view, a "deal" between the two countries would have been. One agreement-the Exchange of Notes of April 28, 1899, defining spheres of influence for the construction of railways in China-had admittedly been reached earlier in the year, but this had done so little to relieve the tension between the two countries in the Far East that this was still at its height when Mr. John Hay, the United States Secretary of State, stepped in to proclaim his "Open Door" policy. Such, indeed, were the relations between Great Britain and Russia in the summer of 1899 that the First Secretary at the German Embassy in St. Petersburg, von Tschirschky, was constrained to report:

I do not believe that there is scope within the framework of Russian policy-or, as far as I can imagine, within that of English policy-[for the two countries] to reach agreement and bind themselves in writing on general political questions of this nature. Moreover, it seems to me that the basis for such an agreement between these States is lacking because, in view of the inability of Russia in practice to oppose British claims to the Persian Gulf, Russia's undertaking to give up her own pretensions to the Persian Gulf would have little value for England. [Report of von Tschirschky, First Secretary of the German Embassy in St. Petersburg, 3 July 1899.]

Nor did the attitude adopted by the Russians in the Transvaal crisis bring any improvement in the situation. Indeed, so violent were the pro-Boer outbursts in the Russian press that the British Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, Mr. Charles Hardinge, was moved, on October 18, 1899, to write a long and impassioned despatch to Lord Salisbury, drawing the British Foreign Secretary's attention to the "bitterness and hostility" which was being displayed towards Great Britain, and pointing out that, in view of the control normally exercised over the Russian editors, these were undoubtedly receiving official blessing and support.

If, therefore, there is no real evidence of a "deal"-and, indeed, no conceivable basis for one-between Great Britain and Russia on the Venezuelan Boundary question, how in fact are the peculiar circumstances which Mr. Mallet-Prevost seeks to attribute to the award to be explained? Is it not necessary here to take into account the attitude of the President of the Tribunal, whose desire to have a unanimous award seems to provide the key to the whole situation? Indeed, was it not M. de Martens' desire for unanimity which caused him, in bringing both parties to accept a compromise, to put pressure upon the British judges, as well as upon their American colleagues? And did he not thereby sacrifice the British "right" to a boundary starting at Point Barima and following the Schomburgk line, just as much as he sacrificed the Venezuelan "right" to a boundary starting at the Moruca River? Surely if M. de Martens' sole concern had been to accommodate the British, who clearly at no stage in the arbitration cared whether the final decision was to be unanimous or not, he would have voted with Lord Russell and Lord Justice Collins (assuming, that is, that both favored the British claim) in support of the full Schomburgk line, thereby overruling Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer, who allegedly preferred a line beginning at the Moruca River.

The thoughts which were uppermost in M. de Martens' mind as the Tribunal reached its final verdict are patent from the speech which he delivered after announcing the award on October 3, 1899-a speech which is recorded verbatim in "Protocol No. 56" of the Tribunal. In that speech the President devoted the emphasis of his remarks to the place which he thought the arbitration might have in the development of international law and to the significance which he attached to the Tribunal's unanimity; and from this it becomes clear how much he himself had labored to secure that unanimity. If, he pointed out, one recalled the cases submitted to international arbitration from the Alabama Case of 1873 to the Bering Sea Fisheries dispute of 1893, one saw that the awards were always rendered by a majority vote, and that there were always dissenting opinions among the arbitrators. In the Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration, however, the parties had had "the satisfaction of having unanimity among the arbitrators on all sections of the award, without any reservation whatsoever." This unanimity was the paramount achievement of the present Tribunal. "C'est un fait qu'il est nécessaire d' affirmer et de proclamer, c'est un idéal vers lequel il faut tendre. . . La force morale d'une Sentence Arbitrale unanime est d'une valeur incalculable." [Translation: It is a fact that it is necessary to affirm and proclaim, it is an ideal toward which we must strive. . . The moral strength of a unanimous Arbitral Award is of incalculable value.]

In view of Judge Schoenrich's contention that "the award created general surprise and disappointment" and that "students of the Venezuelan side of the controversy were shocked at the excessive grant of territory to British Guiana", it may be worth while, in conclusion, to consider some of the contemporary reactions to the verdict of the Tribunal.

At the beginning of their interview with Reuter's correspondent already quoted, Mr. Mallet-Prevost and General Harrison spoke of the award as a "victory" for Venezuela. They stated:

Within the Schomburgk line lay the Amakuru River and Point Barima, the latter forming the southern entrance to the great mouth of the Orinoco. No portion of the entire territory possessed more strategic value than this, both from a commercial and a military stand-point, and its possession by Great Britain was most jealously guarded. This point had been awarded to Venezuela, and along with it a strip of coast about 50 miles in length, both giving to Venezuela the entire control of the Orinoco River. In the interior another long tract to the east of the Schomburgk line, some 3,000 square miles in extent had also been awarded to Venezuela, and thus, by a decision in which the British arbitrators had themselves concurred, the position taken up by the British Government until 1896 had been shown to be without foundation. This in no way expressed the extent of Venezuela's victory. Great Britain had put forward a claim to more than 30,000 square miles of territory west of the Schomburgk line, and it was this territory which in 1890 she was disposed to submit to arbitration. Every foot of this territory had been awarded to Venezuela. [The Times, Oct. 4, 1899.]

In a despatch to Lord Salisbury, in which he was at pains to explain, inter alia, why the full British claim had not been recognized, Mr. George W. Buchanan, the British Agent, reported that the result

may, I think, be considered highly satisfactory, more especially as it has been arrived at by a unanimous decision of the Tribunal of Arbitration. No serious British interests have been sacrificed, though it would no doubt have been more satisfactory had the mouth of the Barima been left in the absolute possession of Great Britain. . .[Mr. Buchanan to Lord Salisbury, 3 October 1899.]

From Caracas the British Minister, Mr. W. H. D. (afterwards Sir W.) Haggard, reported to Lord Salisbury on October 7, 1899, that:

The news of the decision of the Guiana Boundary Commission has been received here with the greatest apparent indifference by the public. It is hardly even a matter of comment, and with the exception of an article in the semi-official paper, I have not as yet seen any newspaper article on the subject. I have, on the other hand, been told privately by Venezuelans of education that they regretted extremely that Barima has been awarded to them as now they can never hope for the wealth and prosperity of the region of the Orinoco which would have resulted from that river being open to our commercial influence. . . Thoughtful Venezuelans realise that they have gained a tract of land which will be of no more value to them than the many thousand square miles of unoccupied wilderness which they now possess; whereas, had this been in English hands, they would have indirectly benefited to a large extent by the settled, orderly government and consequent prosperity of their neighbour - from proximity to whom they will now continue to be to a great extent cut off. [Mr. Haggard to Lord Salisbury, 7 October 1899.]

On October 19 the Minister added that more accurate information on the nature of the award from English and American sources had "made no change in the indifference and apathy of the public here towards the whole question"; and he went on to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to an editorial which had appeared in the Tiempo, the leading newspaper in Caracas, as confirming, notwithstanding its "notoriously anti-English bias," the impressions which he had conveyed to Lord Salisbury [Mr. Haggard to Lord Salisbury, 19 October 1899.]

The course of the Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary controversy had been followed with great interest, and, in the case of Mr. Cleveland, with much anxiety, by successive Presidents of the United States. It had been the good offices of President Cleveland which had prepared the way for the Treaty of 1897 and thereby helped to bring the dispute to arbitration in 1899; and it was his successor, President McKinley, who, of all heads of state whose own national interests were not immediately concerned, had probably taken the greatest pains to ensure that the arbitration was successful. For that reason it is perhaps not inappropriate to refer in conclusion to the observations on the award which President McKinley addressed to Congress in his Message of December 5, 1899. For the opinion delivered in that Message was presumably not formed without careful consideration of all the facts relating to the arbitration. After stating that:

The International Commission of Arbitration, appointed under the Anglo-Venezuelan treaty of 1897, rendered an award on October 3rd last, whereby the boundary line between Venezuela and British Guiana is determined, thus ending a controversy which has existed for the greater part of the century,

the President observed that:

The award, as to which the arbitrators were unanimous, while not meeting the extreme contention of either party, gives to Great Britain a large share of the interior territory in dispute and to Venezuela the entire mouth of the Orinoco, including Barima Point and the Caribbean littoral for some distance to the eastward.

The decision, he concluded, "appears to be equally satisfactory to both parties."

C. SUMMARY OF MALLET-PREVOST INACCURACIES

In summary, the Mallet-Prevost memorandum had numerous inaccuracies which were exposed by Clifton Child. These inaccuracies were:

1. Mallet-Prevost claimed that he spoke with Tribunal member Lord Chief Justice Russell, one of the British judges on the Arbitral Tribunal at a dinner in January 1899, and from that time knew that he could not count on the judge to decide the boundary question on the basis of strict rights.

However, Justice Russell in January 1899 was not a member of the Tribunal. He only became one in March 1899 when he was appointed as a substitute following the death of one of the original jurists on the Tribunal, Lord Herschell, on the 1 March 1899.

2. Mallet-Prevost contended that Lord Collins (the other British member of the Tribunal) had asked many questions critical of the British position; but after a two-week recess during which period the alleged "deal" with Russia was made, he asked very few questions.

Child's examination of the records of the Arbitral proceedings revealed that most of the questions during the first few days were asked by Justice Russell when the British lawyer, Sir Richard Webster, made his presentation. Lord Collins, therefore, could hardly show partiality towards the British cause.

Actually, it was Mallet-Prevost, during his presentation on behalf of Venezuela, who received critical questioning from Lord Collins. On the seventeenth day of the proceedings (24 July 1899) Lord Collins rebuked Mallet-Prevost for the poor presentation of his arguments. In his memorandum, Mallet-Prevost suggested that the same Lord Collins was involved in the "deal" against Venezuela.

Further, Mallet-Prevost was inaccurate to claim that Lord Collins asked very few questions after the recess. The judge asked a varied amount of questions during every session, with the highest amount-twenty-nine questions-being asked during Mallet-Prevost's post-recess presentation.

3. There was never any two-week recess as claimed by Mallet-Prevost. Of the several recesses, the longest one lasted for nine days.

4. There was no record-newspaper article or otherwise-to show that the alleged "conspirators" were together in London during any of the recesses. Newspapers reported the movement out of France of all those concerned with the hearing, even down to the lawyers who presented the British case, and it would have been difficult for them to miss reporting the movement of three of the judges.

5. Mallet-Prevost's contention that the two American judges felt that the boundary line should run along the Moruca (Moruka) River was not supported by one of the very American judges, Justice Brewer, who had said that if the judges were asked individually to give a border line, "each would have given one differing in extent and character".

In relation to the alleged "deal" between Britain and Russia, as claimed by Mallet-Prevost, no evidence was put forward by him to verify his allegation. Even if the allegation were true, it was strange to learn from a report from Petrograd by Charles Harding on the 18 October 1899, two weeks after the Arbitral Award, that the Russian press was attacking Britain with "bitterness and hostility" over British policies in the far East and the Transvaal. In the summer of 1899, the First Secretary of the German Embassy in Russia, Von Tschirshky, had also reported: "I do no believe that there is scope within the work of Russian policy-or as far as I can see within that of English policy-(for the two countries) to reach agreement and bind themselves in writing on general political questions of this nature."

In a footnote to his article, Child wrote:

It ought perhaps to be noted here, if only in fairness to the judges, that we have only Mr. Mallet-Prevost's word for it that the Tribunal divided as he states; i.e., that the two British arbitrators were disposed to award Great Britain all the territory east of the Schomburgk line, starting from Point Barima on the coast, and that the two American arbitrators, on the other hand, favored a boundary which would start at the Moruca River and give Venezuela all the territory west of this. This simple division between the judges does not accord with the statement of Mr. Justice Brewer's which Judge Schoenrich himself quotes in his note (although the fact apparently escapes Judge Schoenrich's notice).

According to Justice Brewer, if any of the judges had been asked to give an award "each would have given one differing in extent and character." In other words, there were not two conflicting views as to where the boundary ought to be drawn, but four or even five. Consequently, as Justice Brewer observes, the judges had to "adjust" their differing views and "finally draw a line running between what each thought was right." (Italics added.)

Nor does Justice Brewer suggest that there was any pressure brought to bear upon him to acknowledge a decision in which he did not concur. On the contrary, he states that ''it was only by the greatest conciliation and mutual concession that a compromise was arrived at.'' (Italics added.) This was presumably a source, not of resentment, but of satisfaction to him in that, as he himself states, he had believed until the last moment that a decision would be quite impossible.

The implication of Mr. Mallet-Prevost's statement that the British judges were more anxious to secure a decision favorable to Great Britain than to see that justice was done to both sides, is not in any way borne out by remarks which Justice Brewer let fall to Mr. George W. Buchanan, the British Agent. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Buchanan on July 23, 1899, Justice Brewer apparently "expressed great admiration for the impartial and strict sense of justice shown by the British arbitrators during the proceedings of the Tribunal, adding that he hoped that the Court would not find it difficult to agree as to the award."

D. SUPPORT FOR MALLET-PREVOST

The Mallet-Prevost memorandum, however, received support from another American historian, William Cullen Dennis in the same issue of the American Journal of International Law that carried Child's article. In his article, Dennis attacked Child's statement that the story was based upon imagination, and revealed that much of the details of the memorandum had been displayed to him by Mallet-Prevost since 1910. However, he suggested that Mallet-Prevost did not realise that de Martens probably used the same tactics on the Americans and the British in order to force a unanimous decision.

Despite their difference in opinions, both Child and Dennis agreed that the 1899 Award was valid, but the latter hoped that the methods of "political compromise" should not be applied to any future arbitral procedure.

E. VENEZUELA'S MOTIVES

It must be noted that the Mallet-Prevost memorandum was published at a time when Venezuela had started to expand on its exploitation of mineral resources including petroleum, iron ore and manganese in its Guayana region immediately to the west of the Guyana border. Much of the expansion works were being carried out by American companies and, thus, a very large amount of American capital was involved.

With the discovery of huge deposits of petroleum, iron ore and manganese in the region, many rightist Venezuelan politicians, hoping to gain cheap popularity, began to use the Mallet-Prevost allegations to whip up nationalist fervour and anti-Guyanese and anti-British feelings among the Venezuelan people. At the same time, they commenced publicly to call for the "reclamation" of the western Essequibo on the grounds that since, according to them, the 1899 Award was invalid, then Venezuela must reclaim all the territory it was claiming before the signing of the Washington Treaty of Arbitration in 1897.

A number of Venezuelan newspapers also took up the issue by saying that Venezuela could become even more prosperous by seizing the western Essequibo since that region was already known to possess abundant mineral and other natural resources. These newspapers, like the right-wing politicians, also used as evidence of the nullity of the 1899 Award the allegations of Mallet-Prevost. Significantly, these allegations of Mallet-Prevost were to remain the only "evidence" of the Venezuelan claimants to Guyanese territory. Even though the Venezuelan Government refused to accept that the border was in dispute, (at least up to 1962), nevertheless, an official delegation of Venezuela raised the issue of nullity of the 1899 Award and Venezuela's claim to western Essequibo, at the Fourth Conference of American Chancellors held in the United States of America in 1951.

In Venezuela itself, rightist political groupings with strong pro-American tendencies, began a systematic campaign to capture American interest in the situation since they expected that, should Venezuela take control of the western Essequibo, American capital and companies would be involved in the exploitation of the resources there. No doubt, too, American Government agencies were taking an interest in the yet unofficial claim to the western Essequibo, a claim which was gradually growing in proportion among the Venezuelan people. In his book, Forbidden Freedom, (published in 1954 in London), Dr. Cheddi Jagan, Leader of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) of Guyana, quoted the British journal, Church Times, of the 16 October 1953 as commenting on the growing American interest in the situation:

Iron ore deposits covering 75 square miles have been discovered in Venezuela near the British Guiana border. On the British Guiana side of the frontier, iron ore deposits have also been discovered which may well be a continuation of those in Venezuela. They are claimed to be the biggest in the world.

The frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela, moreover, in the region where the new iron ore deposits have been discovered, is in dispute. This is one reason for the American interest in the deterioration of the situation. . .

F. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN VENEZUELA

In the period following the publication of Mallet-Prevost's allegations, Venezuela experienced a number of political crises, with the result that in many cases, right-wing politicians holding extremist positions gained the upper hand.

On the 24 December 1948, President Rumulo Gallegos of the Accion Democratica (AD) party was overthrown by a strong right-wing section of the army, and a military junta under Carlos Delgado Chalboud (who was later declared President) took control of the country. The junta carried out a number of retrogressive policies and its main blows were directed against the Communist Party (CPV) which it eventually outlawed in the 13 May 1951. The political and economic situation deteriorated rapidly and this eventually led to popular demonstrations and riots in Caracas on the 13 October of the same year. The junta brutally smashed this revolt after alleging that it was fomented by the illegal Communist Party and the liberals of the Accion Democratica. One month later, on the 13 November, President Chalboud was assassinated and he was succeeded by another member of the junta, Suarez Flammerich.

On 30 November 1953, there was eventually a return to constitutional rule when Presidential elections were held, but despite widespread allegations of fraud, Marcos Perez Jemenez, the army's nominee, was nevertheless declared the winner. The National Assembly shortly after named him as provisional President.

Jemenez's term as President was marked by severe repression on liberal and left-wing forces, particularly the Communist Party. On 4 November 1957 he cancelled the Presidential elections scheduled for 15 December of that year and announced that a plebiscite would be held instead. But following allegations of fraud during the plebiscite which permitted Jemenez to rule for another four-year term, an uprising broke out on the 31 December against him. Finally, on 23 January 1958, a Patriotic Junta led by Wolfgang Larrazabal ousted Jemenez. The new junta which included progressive elements of the military forces, held elections on 7 December 1958, and Rumulo Betancourt of Accion Democratica was elected President.

G. POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRITISH GUIANA

The resuscitation of the claim to the territory of British Guiana, even though unofficially, by anti-communist politicians and nationalistic sections of the media in Venezuela, coincided with the growing popularity of the socialist-oriented Political Affairs Committee (PAC) in British Guiana. The PAC, formed in November 1946, was led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan who was already becoming well-known throughout the Caribbean for his pro-socialist and anti-colonialist views. In 1950, the PAC transformed itself into the People's Progressive Party (PPP), and under the leadership of Dr. Jagan and Forbes Burnham, its Chairman, soon won mass support among the people. The PPP agitated for political, social and economic reforms and vigorously attacked colonialism, the state under which British Guiana still languished. By 1951, it was apparent that the rapid growth of the popularity of the PPP was of severe annoyance to the British colonialists and other anti-communist elements, including those in Venezuela where there was an intensification of the call by sections of the media and extremist forces for the Venezuelan Government to officially press the claim for the western Essequibo.

It might reasonably be argued that the aim of the Venezuelan extremist elements (who had already influenced the banning of the Communist Party of Venezuela) was to coerce the Guyanese people to reject the socialist-oriented PPP and make them believe that any future PPP Government would cause the Venezuelans, not only to claim Guyanese territory, but to seize it by force. However, such an argument was never raised in the 1953 election campaign in British Guiana, and if it were, the Guyanese people, who by this time held strong faith in the PPP, would have regarded it as a colonialist plot to undermine the influence of the Party and, therefore, it would have been rejected completely.

The Guyanese people gave full support to the PPP and in April 1953 they voted a PPP Government into power under a colonial constitution that ushered in universal adult suffrage. Universal adult suffrage itself was one of the political gains achieved by the people through the struggle of the PPP during the period 1950-1953. However, despite the victory of the PPP, the British Government, heavily influenced by the US Government and working in close alliance with local anti-popular anti-PPP organisations, suspended the constitution on the 9 October of the same year and removed the PPP Government from power. In doing this, British troops and warships were sent to British Guiana to enforce the British decision. The reason given by the colonial power, Great Britain, was that the PPP was planning to establish a communist regime in the country.

Following the overthrow of the PPP Government and the subsequent imprisonment of many of its leaders, including Dr. Jagan, there followed a period of an appointed interim Government made up of mainly the anti-socialist politicians who were defeated in the April 1953 elections. Many of these persons had helped to engineer the removal of the PPP administration.

In February 1955, the PPP, now the opposition force, was split when the rightist section led by Forbes Burnham, broke away to form a separate political party. This group had initially tried to seize the Party's leadership during a special conference held at that time. It was strongly anti-socialist and it also called itself the People's Progressive Party and carried out a vigorous campaign against the original PPP and its leaders, particularly Dr. Jagan. Despite this, at the general election held in August 1957, the original PPP won a resounding victory. Burnham's party shortly after changed its name to the People's National Congress (PNC) after it was heavily defeated in the election.

In 1958, Dr. Jagan as head of the new PPP Government, which functioned under a constitution which gave it limited powers and with greater control vested in the British Governor, paid a courtesy visit to Venezuela. During this visit, he held talks with all the leading Venezuelan political parties on a number of issues including the claim to the western Essequibo which was being championed by sections of the Venezuelan media and a number of politicians. In the course of the discussions, all the parties stated that while they would never renounce the claim, they, on the other hand, would never resurrect it.

Two years later, in February 1960, both Dr. Jagan and Forbes Burnham, the Opposition Leader, attended the Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom in Caracas, Venezuela. There they held talks with various political parties but not a word about Venezuela's claim to Guyanese territory was raised by the Venezuelans.

At about the same period, Jai Narine Singh, a former leading member of the PPP who had joined with Burnham to form the PNC, from which he shortly after resigned, formed his own political party, the Guiana Independence Movement, which he later renamed the Democratic Party. Both Singh and his party had virtually no support locally, but he became a constant visitor to Venezuela where he became a strong spokesman for anti-communism and constantly attacked the PPP and called for a closer alliance of the PNC, the United Force, a big-business party formed in 1959, and his party for the removal of the PPP Government. The Guiana Times Magazine (Volume 9, Numbers 1 and 2 of 1960), a journal critical of the Government, claimed that Singh worked in close alliance with certain Venezuelan politicians who had their eyes on "70,000 square miles of land" in Guyana.

In the general election held in August 1961, the PPP again won a resounding victory under a new constitution that ushered in internal self-government. The main issue for this election was independence which the PPP championed, and its victory was widely viewed as a mandate to lead the country to full independence. The Government, under the leadership of the Premier, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, immediately instituted programmes to prepare the people for this new stage of political development.

CHAPTER 16

THE RENEWAL OF VENEZUELA'S CLAIM

As the movement towards independence gathered momentum in British Guiana, the clamour of the expansionist voices in Venezuela for their Government to officially resurrect its claim to the western Essequibo grew louder. This the Venezuelan Government eventually did in February 1962 when the United Nations Fourth Committee, which dealt with matters of decolonisation, was discussing the issue of independence for British Guiana. Venezuela, basing its case on the Mallet Prevost memorandum, officially raised the contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 was invalid, and put forward the claim that the region west of the Essequibo River was Venezuelan territory. While Venezuela supported independence for British Guiana, it objected to the western Essequibo being included as Guyanese territory. Venezuela also insisted that since it was of the view that the Award of 1899 was invalid, it reasserted its claim to the western Essequibo, alleging it owned that territory before the Washington Treaty of Arbitration of 1897.

A. THE VENEZUELAN MEMORANDUM

The Venezuelan claim was in the form of a memorandum which was presented to the UN Secretary General and which was later distributed to member states of the UN as an official document. It was accompanied by a copy of the Mallet Prevost statement. Later that month, the Venezuelan Government published the following statement about its memorandum:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM
SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN FEBRUARY 1962

Venezuela assumed, from the time of its declaration of independence, the sovereignty over the territories under Spanish dominion constituting the Captaincy General of Venezuela.

The boundary of the province of Guayana's administrative division of the Captaincy General extends to the western bank of the Essequibo River. On the 13th August, 1814 the Dutch ceded to Great Britain the establishments of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice. In the Treaty of Transfer, it was not decided with exactitude which were the boundaries of the territories ceded, but it can be proved by documents of that time that these territories did not extend in any case beyond the banks of the Essequibo River.

Almost simultaneously with the occupation of the establishments of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice, the English started a series of actions, tending to extend its possessions in territories which belonged to Venezuela. The territory which the British received from the Dutch was approximately 20,000 square miles.

After the successful explorations and demarcations made unilaterally by the British, the territory of the colony had increased by the middle of the century to 60,000 square miles. By 1855, it had reached 76,000 square miles. Subsequently, the British aspirations extended to 109,000 square miles.

The reiterated protests of successive Venezuelan Governments and a request that the boundary problem be submitted to an impartial arbitration were always evaded with diplomatic excuses.

In 1886, the Venezuelan Government solicited or requested of Britain the evacuation of territory illegally occupied. In view of the British negation, Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with her on 20th February, 1887. The pretensions of Great Britain's dominion continued, nevertheless, until it reached the very mouth of the Orinoco, the most important river of Venezuela.

It was at this time, alarmed by British expansion in the Americas, the President of the United States, Grover Cleveland, exercised all his political and diplomatic influence with the object of reaching and carrying out an agreement for Venezuela and Britain to submit the question to arbitration. Following the Arbitration Award, and with the move towards independence by the Guyanese people many years later, the Venezuelan Government, in a memorandum to the United Nations stated that "by virtue of the General Assembly of the United Nations examining problems related with the independence of British Guiana, the Venezuelan Government, in defence of the rights of its people, has thought it fit to request that it also takes account of Venezuela's just claims and that the injustice committed be rectified.

Venezuela's Government views with great sympathy the independence of British Guiana in conformity with its well known sentiments and with its reiterated anti colonial doctrine. The Venezuelan Government warmly supports the aspirations of the people of British Guiana to obtain their total political independence and formally declares its support for such a just aspiration.

In reaffirming before the United Nations its irrefutable rights, Venezuela aspires that international law safeguards it, and in accordance with the principles and objects of the United Nations Charter to see how it can resolve, through negotiation between interested parties, the old issue between Venezuela and the United Kingdom in relation to the boundary with British Guiana.

B. VENEZUELA'S PROPOSAL FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT

Immediately after Venezuela presented it memorandum to the UN, it began to make overtures to the British Government for cooperation in the joint development of the western Essequibo. This matter was first raised in March 1962 by President Romulo Betancourt to the British Ambassador to Venezuela, Sir Douglas Busk. The President suggested that Britain and Venezuela, without the involvement of the British Guiana Government, should jointly administer an area along the frontier to provide a security cordon. In his report to the British Foreign Office, the Ambassador expressed his opposition to such an idea since this would mean carrying out an activity "behind Jagan's back". He was adamant that Dr. Jagan should not be excluded from any discussion between Venezuela and Britain on the border issue. As a result, the British Foreign Office refused to discuss "joint development" with Venezuela.

C. THE BRITISH REPLY

In reply to the Venezuelan memorandum, Sir Patrick Dean, a special British representative to the UN, took the position that the border dispute had been settled by the 1899 Award and that the question could not be reopened on the posthumous word of an aged lawyer who had nursed grievances against the Tribunal for the whole of his life. In his lengthy address to the Special Political Committee of the UN on the 19 September 1962, Dean repudiated all Venezuelan claims to Guyanese territory. With specific reference to the allegation that Britain and Russia had a "political deal" in 1899, Dean showed that the two countries were not on friendly terms during that period and it was, therefore, improbable that they would have joined to conspire against Venezuela. He further pointed out that the Russians saw the Award as "substantially in favour of Venezuela". Dean also explained that by the Treaty of London of 1814 signed by Britain and the United Netherlands, the latter surrendered the colonies of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo to Britain, and even though the boundary of the area was not defined by treaty, it was held to be the area totally occupied by the Dutch, an understanding which remained unchallenged by Spain or by the Republic of Great Colombia with which Venezuela merged in 1819. Dean showed that Venezuela waited until thirty six years after the Treaty of London was signed to request that the boundary be defined by treaty.

He concluded: It has always been the key stone of British policy that respect for international agreements is not only essential for world stability, but axiomatic if the rule of international law is to survive. If we allow a departure from these principles, I submit that we shall soon be inundated with claims from all over the world for reopening of questions which have been regarded as settled for generations.

D. FURTHER STATEMENT BY VENEZUELA

The border issue was further discussed at another meeting of the UN Special Committee on the 12 November 1962. At that meeting, Dr. Marcos Falcon Briceno, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, said that his country was not asking the UN to pass judgement on the substance of the boundary dispute. He was merely putting on record the reasons why Venezuela could not recognise the 1899 Award as valid. He agreed that Venezuela had signed the arbitral treaty with Great Britain in 1897, but insisted that "Venezuela had nevertheless signed it hoping for a solution on the rule of law".

In his concluding remarks, Dr. Falcon Briceno said that his Government was seeking a friendly solution of the problem with Great Britain and added that Venezuela was totally in support of independence for British Guiana.

E. BRITISH OFFER FOR EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS

The British Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, Colin Crowe, replied that it was unfortunate that the issue should have been raised at this time when the British Government was preparing the people of British Guiana for full independence, but he accepted the assurance of the Venezuelan Government "that there is no intention... to affect or delay the independence of British Guiana". He added:

Our hope is, however, that the matter can be disposed of once and for all so that British Guiana can enter into her independence without any doubts about her territory or her frontiers. It would be easy for Britain to leave the matter in abeyance, but we consider that as wrong.

The British Government does not accept that there is any frontier dispute to discuss. There is no reason why the Government of British Guiana would accept it either: nor do they, and we cannot urge them to discuss it. Our hope is that this problem can be fairly disposed of now so that this question mark can be removed from British Guiana's future. . .

The experts of my Government have conducted a very thorough examination of the records available to them and are completely satisfied that there is no justification whatsoever for reopening this frontier question. They are also convinced that a thorough examination of these records cannot lead to any other conclusion. I am, therefore, authorised to say that my Government, with the full concurrence of the Government of British Guiana, are prepared to discuss with the Venezuelan Government, through diplomatic channels, arrangements for a tripartite, Venezuela British Guiana United Kingdom examination of the voluminous documentary material relevant to this question. For our part, we would naturally expect to examine any Venezuelan records and documents too. In making this offer I must make it very clear that this is in no sense an offer to engage in substantive talks about the revision of the frontier. This we cannot do, for we consider that there is no justification for it. The offer on this part of my Government simply reflects our anxiety, having regard to our friendly ties with Venezuela, to dispel any doubts which the Venezuelan Government may still have about the validity or propriety of the Arbitral Award….

We believe that this offer represents the best means of removing once and for all the misunderstanding which has arisen between us. . . .

Crowe concluded that the Award was not challenged for sixty three years and stipulated that ". . . if after such a lapse the question could be reopened, there will be no frontier agreement which cannot be questioned and no international agreement which cannot be brought into doubt..."

The offer by Great Britain for an examination of the documents was accepted by Venezuela and endorsed by the Special Committee of the UN. The joint examination of the documents was carried out both in London and Caracas between 1963 and 1965 and the reports of the experts appointed by each side were exchanged. Nevertheless, Venezuela refused to be convinced even though it could not produce any document to support its contention.

Meanwhile, Venezuela continued to push its proposal for joint development. In June 1963 the Venezuelan Ambassador in London, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, proposed to British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, that the World Bank should be asked to send a mission to survey the minerals and other resources of the frontier area with a view to their joint-development by Britain, Venezuela and the World Bank. Lord Home assessed that the proposal had been made "somewhat perfunctorily" and refused to give it any consideration.

F. THUNDER EDITORIAL

During the period of the examination of the documents, Venezuelan spokesmen and sections of the Venezuelan media constantly made aggressive statements against British Guiana and maintained a verbal war in voicing their country's claim to the western Essequibo. Some Venezuelan Government officials even interpreted the examination of the documents to mean that the Government of British Guiana was willing to reopen the question of the frontier. The PPP Government of British Guiana refuted these false statements on numerous occasions, but despite the fact that the Venezuela misrepresentations were given full publicity in the Chronicle, the Graphic and the Argosy, three strong anti PPP newspapers in the country, very little publicity was given to statements of the British Guiana Government.

The PPP made a strong condemnation of the Venezuelan claim in an editorial in the December 1963 issue of Thunder, its official monthly newspaper. The editorial stated:

THE BORDER ISSUE

Alas, Venezuela is belatedly claiming 40,000 (sic) square miles of British Guiana's territory.

All that portion of the country from the present border with Venezuela right up to the left Bank of the Essequibo River - the North West, Pomeroon, the Rupununi - is now being brazenly and amazingly claimed as Venezuela's.

Guianese were jolted by this claim first made within recent times in October 1962 on the eve of the country's Independence Talks. This was a most unfriendly act to have carne from a neighbouring country with whom we had always lived in peace and for whose peoples, tradition and culture we bore high regard. The independence Talks ended abortively in November 1962 and nothing further was heard of the Venezuela's speculative claim.

New Independence Talks were fixed for October 1963 - and concurrently with the fixing of these talks the Venezuelan reactionaries revived their claim to British Guiana's territory.

Venezuela's claim has no merit whatever. Based on bogus grants from the King of Spain the claim was originally made in the last century and was finally settled by arbitration in 1899 with the consent of all the parties including Venezuela, and was accepted by all parties as justly and impartially settling the issues. Thereafter, Guianese lived on the land in question peacefully. The British system of rule of law, of democracy, and British administration and currency ruled supreme and undisturbed and unquestioned.

Sixty three years later, however, on the eve of Guyana's independence and after the Arbitrators had passed to the "Great Beyond", Venezuela made a "posthumous" claim to an area long settled as being British Guiana's.

Thunder would not have considered this spurious claim worthy of editorial comment but for the strange events that have since taken place.

In 1962 the Government as well as the Opposition were fully apprized of Venezuela's claim, and the parties were alerted to take part in any talks that may have taken place. The Government was kept fully posted with the British point of view on this matter, which, incidentally, was then strongly opposed to Venezuela's claim.

In 1963 after the "Independence" Talks in London, secret talks took place between the British Government and the Venezuelan Government.

On this occasion, the PPP Government delegation were not informed nor were they invited to the talks (even as observers). The British Foreign Secretary and the British Governor in Guiana participated. They have agreed, it is reported, to examine documents in Venezuela alleged to be in support of Venezuela's claim.

We have grown to learn how British treachery works. We will not be surprised to learn that what one year ago they considered amorphous they will now find reason to acclaim meritorious.

The result of British perfidy in this matter will be their handing over Guiana's territory to the Venezuelans, when they are in a position not only to successfully rebut the claim before any international forum, but also to enter a successful counterclaim.

The fact that the claim was made on the eve of Independence is pungent evidence of the Venezuelan reactionaries being goaded by their American masters. Since the US cannot contain Guiana's march to socialism, then they must reduce the area over which socialism will triumph.

The PPP will not recognize this barefaced British self out to the Venezuelans. Guiana's sons will retrieve every square inch of land that the British traitors will shamelessly hand to the Americans, under the guise of giving it to the Venezuelans.

G. THE POSITION OF THE PPP GOVERNMENT- DR. JAGAN'S SPEECH

The Venezuelan claim to the western Essequibo was strongly rejected by the British Guiana Government which set out its main policy statement on the issue on 28 February 1964 when Dr. Cheddi Jagan, the Premier, addressed the Legislative Assembly. His speech which was broadcast on radio also gave details of the developments related to the issue for the period 1962 1963. Dr. Jagan said:

The Government has been perturbed by the misleading and erroneous statements published on the British Guiana Venezuela boundary question. We have attempted to correct these misrepresentations, but our releases have not been given the same publicity that have been given the inaccurate statements made by Venezuelan spokesman. We have been very patient in the face of Venezuelan propaganda. But the time has now come for me to tell the nation the facts of the case and state the Government's stand on the matter.

The boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela was in dispute for the greater part of the nineteenth century. On the 2nd February, 1897, a treaty, the Treaty of Washington, was concluded between the Venezuelan and British Governments. This Treaty provided for an Arbitral Tribunal to be set up to decide upon the common boundary between the two countries. It laid down the composition of the Tribunal, and under it both Governments pledged themselves to accept the Tribunal's award as "a full, perfect and final settlement".

The Arbitration Tribunal commenced its sittings on the 21st June, 1899 and gave its decision on the 3rd October, 1899. The decision was substantially in favour of British Guiana, but Venezuela got the territory between the Wenamu and the Upper Cuyuni, and also the territory between Point Playa and Point Barima, both of which had been claimed by Britain as part of British Guiana. As regards the territory between Point Playa and Point Barima, that is, the lower Barima area, Venezuela had stressed that it was of great strategic and commercial importance to her and it was given to her.

Venezuela accepted the Award, took part between 1901 and 1905 on the demarcation of the boundary in accordance with the Award, and agreed in 1905 to a map resulting from this demarcation. Venezuela has always shown in the past that she regarded adherence to the decision of the Arbitration Tribunal as part of her international obligations. Indeed in 1941, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs himself told the British representative in Caracas that his Government was definitely of the opinion that the boundary question was a chose jugeé, that the Venezuelan British Guiana frontier was final and well defined, and the author of articles which had appeared in the Venezuelan press about that time questioning the 1899 Award "had obviously never had access to the archives of his Ministry".

And then, in 1962, sixty three years after the Award, the Venezuelans raised the matter again at the United Nations. The Venezuelans base their case for reopening the question on a memorandum written in 1944 by Mr. Mallet Prevost, an American lawyer and one of the junior counsel who had conducted the Venezuelan case in 1899. This memorandum was published in 1949 after Mr. Mallet Prevost's death, and claimed that the Arbitral Award was the result of a "political deal" between Britain and Russia.

The British representative pointed out in reply that Mr. Mallet Prevost had argued the Venezuelan case with great passion, that he had nursed grievances against the Tribunal during the whole of his life, and that the frontier issue could not be reopened on the posthumous word of an aged lawyer written forty five years after the question had been settled. Mr. Mallet Prevost had adduced no real evidence for his allegation that the Award was the result of a political deal, and the British experts who had looked at the records of the Tribunal had said that they did not contain a single document which by the widest stretch of the imagination can be considered to indicate a deal between Britain and Russia. The British representative pointed out that the boundary question had been finally settled and the British Government could not agree to reopen it.

The British representative stated that the British Government with the concurrence of the Government of British Guiana was prepared to agree to a tripartite examination of the documents relating to the question "to dispel any doubts which the Venezuelan Government may still have the validity or propriety of the Arbitral Award". He made it clear that the proposal was "in no sense an offer to engage in substantive talks about the revision of the frontier", as neither the British Government nor the British Guiana Government accepted that there was any frontier dispute to discuss.

In accordance with the agreement reached at the United Nations, Venezuelan experts examined British documents in London from 30th July to 11th September, 1963. Arrangements had originally been made for the examination to begin in March 1963, and a British Guiana representative went to London for this purpose. He was available from March to May but the Venezuelans did not turn up. They finally agreed to begin the examination at the end of July. Sir Geoffrey Meade, retired Foreign Service Officer, who was appointed to represent the United Kingdom also represented the Government of British Guiana at the latter's request. On the 5th, 6th and 7th November, 1963, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela met the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom to review the progress in the examination of the documents. The Foreign Ministers agreed that the British expert, Sir Geoffrey Meade, who was also acting on behalf of the Government of British Guiana, should go to Caracas to examine any documents which the Venezuelan Government might wish to produce to support their allegation that the Award was improperly arrived at. Sir Geoffrey Meade was in Caracas from 3rd to 12 December, 1963, and examined the relevant documents produced by the Venezuelan Government. It is learnt that Venezuelan experts have just returned from London. The purpose of their visit appears to be the production of references asked for by Sir Geoffrey Meade during his visit to Caracas.

I wish to emphasize that there are no substantive talks on the revision of the frontier. What is taking place in London is an examination of the documents relating to the Arbitration of 1899, which, it is hoped, will dispel doubts which the Venezuelan Government may still have about the validity of propriety of the Arbitral Award.

And now to conclude. . . I have set the matter out fully and I hope that this Government's stand is quite clear. Every few weeks some Venezuelan claiming to speak on behalf of the Government of his country makes a claim to our territory. We have so far maintained a dignified silence. But I wish to say now clearly and unequivocally that the Government of British Guiana does not accept that there is a frontier dispute. The nineteenth century frontier dispute with Venezuela was settled more than sixty years ago by a Tribunal, whose Award the Venezuelan Government agreed to accept as "full, perfect and final" settlement. We have agreed to a document examination in order to convince the Venezuelans that the Award of 1899 was not fraudulent or improperly arrived at.

But we are not prepared to reopen the frontier issue; we are not prepared to engage in substantive talks on the revision of the frontier. The Government of British Guiana is not prepared to yield to Venezuela or any other country a single rivulet or creek; we are not prepared to surrender a single inch of soil of this country.

H. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE VENEZUELAN CLAIM

There were two factors that influenced Venezuela in 1962 to dispute the 1899 Arbitral Award.

In the first place, around this time left wing guerrillas were in open war against the Venezuelan Government and certain army units were threatening to mutiny. Allegations were even expressed in some sections of the Venezuelan Government that since the PPP Government in British Guiana was giving political and economic support to the Cuban Revolutionary Government, then British Guiana could be used as a trans shipment point for weapons to the guerrillas, who were not only operating near to the border of the two countries, but were also allegedly obtaining weapons from Cuba, some of which might be channelled through British Guiana. However, this allegation was promptly dismissed by the Government of British Guiana.

During this period, too, President Betancourt of Venezuela was rapidly becoming unpopular and he really needed to create a situation to ease the pressure off him and to create a sense of unity among the Venezuelan people. For him, the resurrection of the border claim, which whipped up nationalistic sentiments, was a blessing in disguise.

But according to the PPP, there was a more important reason. British Guiana in 1962 was on the road to independence. This created fear in imperialist circles since it was clear that following independence a socialist government under Dr. Jagan's PPP would be established. Accordingly, the USA, therefore, pressured Venezuela, then a pro American state, to reopen the claim to the western Essequibo, while at the same time instigating disturbances in Guyana with the aid of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and local anti PPP forces from 1962 to 1964. During this period, Forbes Burnham's People's National Congress (PNC), as a useful ally of US and British imperialism, played a leading destabilising role. This was also a time of vehement anti Cuban campaign by the USA, in particular; and the PPP Government, as an open ally of Castro's Cuba, was forced to defend itself from scathing anti communist attacks by the British and American Governments and from local anti Government forces, particularly the PNC and the United Force (UF). Forbes Burnham, the leader of the PNC, in a speech to the Washington Press Club on a visit to the USA in May 1962, released one of his anti Cuban and anti communist outbursts when he claimed that there were "one thousand Cubans" in British Guiana giving assistance to the PPP. However, at the time of Burnham's visit to the USA there was actually only one Cuban in British Guiana!

Further, the threat from Venezuela was aimed at generating fear among Guyanese so that they would be influenced to choose a Government which would win the support of an American-British alliance against any aggression by Venezuela. Since the American Government, in particular, had no liking for Dr. Jagan and the PPP, it was obvious that the Guyanese people were being indirectly told that Burnham and the PNC were preferred, and that under a Burnham-led Government, an American-British alliance could be depended upon to prevent any aggressive designs by Venezuela.

I. REMOVAL OF THE PPP GOVERNEMNT

As a result of the anti-Government disturbances of 1962 1964, the British Government was influenced to delay independence until a suitable pro American Government, subsequently in the form of a PNC UF coalition, was established in December 1964. In the general elections under a new electoral system of proportional representation imposed by the British Government, the PPP won the highest proportion of votes, but the British Governor asked Burnham to form a government with the understanding that the PNC leader would form a coalition with the UF. It was under this pro American coalition Government that just one and a half years later, on the 26 May 1966, independence was granted to the country which from then became officially known as Guyana.

During the 1961 1964 period, the Venezuelan Governments of both Romulo Betancourt and Raul Leoni were antagonistic towards the PPP Government, which was described as "communist". On the other hand, they were very friendly towards the anti communist PNC which was the leading opposition party in British Guiana. For the 1964 elections campaign in British Guiana, thousands of T-shirts on which were printed anti communist slogans urging support for the PNC, were sent from Venezuela to be distributed to PNC supporters. Notably, these campaign T-shirts were sent by organisations supportive of the policies of the Venezuelan Government, including its claim to the western Essequibo. But assistance to the PNC from Venezuela included more than campaign material for elections. Rickey Singh, editor of the Caribbean Contact, writing in the June 1981 on the border controversy, mentioned:

There were persistent reports of reports of arms and explosives, including US manufactured hand grenades, arriving from across Venezuela for the PNC during the political violence of 1963 and 1964 that were designed, with the help of the CIA - as subsequently exposed - to get rid of the Jagan Government, and so prevent "another Cuba" in the western hemisphere.

J. SECRET MEMORANDUM - PLAN TO OVERTHROW JAGAN

As a matter of fact, the Venezuelan Government was very much interested in removing Cheddi Jagan's PPP Government and replacing it through a coup by a coalition led by PNC leader Forbes Burnham and UF leader Peter D'Aguiar. The following secret memorandum sent on 10 July 1964 to Secretary of State Dean Rusk by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs William Tyler explained the Venezuelan plan:

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, July 10, 1964.

SUBJECT: Venezuela's Interest in British Guiana

A reliable controlled American source reports that Venezuela's Foreign Minister Ignacio Irribaren Borges wishes to talk with you privately during the Latin American Foreign Ministers Conference about British Guiana. He is expected to tell you that Venezuela is prepared to support the overthrow of Cheddi Jagan, and to seek our support for this venture.

Our Ambassador in Caracas has learned from the Minister of the Interior that Venezuela is ready to provide financial support for Forbes Burnham when the time is ripe for Jagan's overthrow.

A report from Georgetown advises that a person with good contacts in Venezuela is urging Burnham and D'Aguiar to form a "Revolutionary Government"; attempt a coup with the assistance of 100 trained men who will have had 30 days special training in Venezuela, and at the same time Cheddi and Janet Jagan will be kidnapped and taken to Venezuela.

You may wish to urge restraint on the Venezuelans, pointing out that plans are underway to seek a political resolution in BG through the democratic process of a Proportional Representation election. We hope that nothing will happen to impede this plan and we cannot support the Venezuelans even though we share their hope that someone other than Jagan will reach the top in British Guiana.

On 16 and 20 July 1964 at the State Department in Washington, Rusk met Iribarren Borges, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister in the Leoni administration. According to a footnote on the secret memorandum (which was finally declassified and released by the State Department in 2004), they confined their discussions on an upcoming OAS resolution on Cuba, and that "no evidence has been found to indicate whether Iribarren Borges raised the Venezuelan proposal to intervene in British Guiana."

With the removal of the PPP Government in December 1964, it was now left to the PNC UF coalition Government to take up the dialogue with Venezuela.

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CHAPTER 17

CHAPTER 18

PPP EFFORTS FOR A UNITED POSITION

A. VENEZUELA - BRITISH GUIANA RELATIONS (1965)

Following the December 1964 elections in British Guiana, a coalition Government of the PNC and the UF was formed, with Forbes Burnham, the PNC Leader appointed Premier. The PPP, which had emerged as the most popular party, winning the highest proportion of votes amounting to 24 of the 53 seats in the House of Assembly, now took up the role as the Opposition.

As Premier, Burnham almost immediately after his accession visited Venezuela on 11 and 12 January 1965. He met with President Raul Leoni and other Venezuelan Government officials, and matters relating to trade and developmental assistance were discussed.

As a consequence of this visit, a Venezuelan trade mission arrived in British Guiana in mid February and, at the same time, the first industrial exhibition to be sponsored by Venezuela in the British colony was opened in Georgetown.

Venezuela and the PNC UF coalition Government established closer relations in July 1965 when a team of Venezuelan medical specialists arrived in British Guiana to examine forms of assistance that could be granted to health services. Subsequently, the Venezuelan Government sent several boxes of medicine as a gift to the British Guiana Government which also continued to accept a Venezuelan offer to provide specialist treatment of ailing Guyanese in leading Venezuelan hospitals.

It was apparent that with close relations developing between the two countries that secret talks were going on in an effort to settle the border issue. But the PNC UF efforts to make Venezuela withdraw its claim to the Essequibo region proved to be unsuccessful. Venezuela continued to propose "economic cooperation" and "joint development" and insisted that there should be meetings at ministerial level, even though that country, after an examination of documents, failed to produce any evidence to support the contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 was null and void.

The PNC-UF Government's position was that the border issue and economic cooperation with Venezuela should be kept separate. The British Foreign Office was informed of this policy by Deoroop Maraj, Minister without Portfolio, when he visited London in June 1965. When the new British Ambassador in Caracas was advised of the policy of the new British Guiana administration, he informed the Foreign Office in August 1965 that the Venezuelan proposal of joint-development, as mooted in 1962-1963, would no longer satisfy Venezuela since that country wanted "near de facto sovereignty" of the western Essequibo.

The Venezuelan Government's insistence of having ministerial meetings between Venezuela, on the one hand, and Great Britain and British Guiana on the other, was never opposed by the PNC UF Government. On the 11 July 1965, Premier Burnham stated in the House of Assembly that despite the talks which had already taken place, not a single inch of territory would be yielded to Venezuela.

However, on the 4 October 1965, Burnham announced that ministerial talks on the border issue would take place in London on the 7 November 1965, just before the constitutional conference, aimed at obtaining independence for British Guiana, was to be convened.

Meanwhile, Dr. Jagan raised his party's concerns about the border problems and how they would be handled after independence, when he met with Burnham on 4 October 1965 to discuss outstanding issues related to forthcoming independence conference in London. That meeting made little progress owing to Burnham's refusal to end the existing state of emergency in the country and the release of a number of PPP members from detention. On the following day, Dr. Jagan issued a statement which, inter alia, dealt with the border issue:

"Our border problems are likely to become more vexed in the near future. At the present time we do not have resources to defend our border adequately. The Guyanese people must know what steps the government proposes to take to guarantee its territorial integrity. The leases for the US deactivated naval and air bases must be terminated, as experience has shown that foreign bases in independent sovereign countries are always a source of subversion and sabotage of national sovereignty. They were approved neither on the advice of, nor after consultation with, the elected representatives of the Guyanese people."

He also called upon the Government to inform the Guyanese people as to what plans it had to protect the borders and the territorial integrity of Guyana. This crucial issue was one of the matters he felt should be settled even before the beginning of the independence conference.

B. RESOLUTION OF THE VENEZUELAN CONGRESS

While the preparations for the ministerial meetings were going on, the Venezuelan Congress passed the following resolution on the 13 October 1965:

The Congress of the Republic of Venezuela considering:

1. That the National Government in safeguarding and defending the Supreme National Interest has actually placed before the Government of Great Britain the formal reclamation for the recuperation of the territory Guyana Essequibo, unjustly taken away from Venezuela by the Arbitration Award on 3rd October, 1899.

Considering:

2. That in accordance with the numerous and definite documents that exist, the said Arbitration Award consists of substantial fraud and that it be converted into a void act.

Considering:

3. That the gestures initiated by the National Government, in the name of the Venezuelan State, deserve a just act of solidarity and support, not only of the country's public opinion, but also of the Congress of the Republic which represents the free expression of public will:

AGREES that Article I expresses the unanimous and firm support of the Republic's Congress to the just and patriotic diplomatic gesture that is being put forward by the National Government before the Government of Great Britain in its reclamation of Guyana Essequibo, through which it re-vindicates for Venezuela the important parts of its territory over which it has sufficient historic title and jurisdiction.

Article II declares that the territorial claim is not directed against the independence of British Guiana, and reiterates its anti colonialist position as the basic principle of our international policies, and based also on the Inter American judicial system.

Given, signed and sealed in the Federal Legislative Palace in Caracas on the 13th day of October, 1965, the 156th year of its independence and also of its Federation.

An official copy of this resolution, signed by the President of the Congress, Luis Bertram Preito, Congress Vice President Alirio Ugarte Pelayo, Secretary Antonio Hernendez Foneca and another member, Felix Cordero Falcon, was presented shortly after to the United Nations where it was circulated as an official UN document.

C. NOTE FROM THE VENEZUELAN AMBASSADOR

Just before the British Guiana independence conference was to be convened in London, Hector Santanella, the Venezuelan Ambassador in the British capital sent the following Note to Anthony Lincoln, the British Ambassador in Caracas on the 2 November 1965:

Dear Sir,

On the occasion of the Conference of the Independence of British Guiana on whose happy and fruitful results the Venezuelan Government presents its sincerest congratulations, I have the honour to reiterate to Your Excellency, on express instructions of my Government, the explicit and constant position of Venezuela with respect to colonialism and of the old dispute with the United Kingdom relating to our boundary with British Guiana.

It will not escape the precept of Great Britain the fact that Venezuela, following its own history as a nation that contributed efficiently, has maintained throughout its existence as a Republic a defined position in favour of the independence of all former colonies and territories which were formerly dependent upon the metropolitan countries. Thus, Venezuela's position has been of special application in the process of declaring (independence for) the American territories with which she is particularly connected by the reason of continental brotherhood.

In the case of British Guiana the reasons which move Venezuela to avidly desire its independence are much more powerful, as it is understood that by its geographic proximity the two countries are called upon to consolidate a lasting friendship which will endure in their mutual benefit and of the continent's.

I am not going to lose Your Excellency's attention by citing of significant and numerous declarations of Venezuela on this matter, nor with the facts of the reclamation which it has maintained, and which it will continue clearly and firmly to maintain as its legitimate boundary with British Guiana. The expressions of Venezuela's willingness are also known to Your Excellency to find a friendly solution to the problem with the cooperation of Your Majesty's Government. By the aforesaid, and while the Conference for the Independence of British Guiana is meeting in this capital, I celebrate in the name of my Government the high objects of those who propose the concession of independence to this territory tied by various forms of affection with Venezuela.

Nevertheless, the inalienable right to maintain intact the sacred right of Venezuela in any contingency obliges my Government to renew, at the same time, in a very clear and profound manner, its territorial reclamation.

In consequence, I have the honour to direct to Your Excellency, expressing the voluntary wish of the authorities and the people of Venezuela, to affirm in the most formal manner and category the position of my Government in the sense that no change of status that may occur as British Guiana is concerned, arising out of the declaration of independence or whatever cause, shall in no way affect the territorial rights of Venezuela in the Guyana Essequibo. I ask Your Excellency to have this Note made known to the British Guiana Independence Conference which is meeting in this city after the 2nd of November.

I renew to Your Excellency my highest esteem, etc.

(Signed) Hector Santanella

D. MINISTERIAL MEETING IN LONDON

Meanwhile, the British and Venezuelan experts met in both London and Caracas to examine the records of the arbitration tribunal which settled the boundary between Guyana and Venezuela in 1899. On the eve of the experts' final examination for the year, Dr. Jagan in late October suggested that the United Nations should set up a commission to deal with the issue of the examination of the documents.

At the conclusion of the November 1965 Constitutional Conference, which fixed the 26 May 1966 as the date for the independence of British Guiana, another ministerial meeting occurred on the 9 and 10 December 1965 between the Foreign Minister of Venezuela on the one side and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and the Premier of British Guiana, Forbes Burnham, on the other.

In these discussions, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, formerly the Ambassador in London, proposed in December 1965 the cession of territory to Venezuela and the establishment of a Mixed Commission which would formulate plans for collaboration in the development of "Essequiban Guyana and British Guyana." This proposal was immediately rejected by both the British and the British Guiana Governments. The British Government, however, was willing to discuss economic cooperation provided it was separate from the border issue. It concluded that the Venezuelan proposal for economic cooperation, as it was being pushed in the negotiations, was "constructive" and should be pursued.

At this meeting the stand taken by Great Britain and British Guiana was that there was no dispute as regards the frontier, but that the only dispute was that arising out of Venezuela's contention that the 1899 Award was invalid. Great Britain and British Guiana also stated that the examination of the documentary material had produced no evidence whatever in support of the Venezuelan allegation that the Award was the result of a deal or was otherwise invalid. The discussions, however, were inconclusive and the participants decided that the representatives of the three Governments should meet again in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 1966.

The Agenda for the Geneva Conference was not released, but an idea of it could be obtained from the matters discussed at the very meeting held in London on the 9 and 10 December 1965. This meeting made an important concession to Venezuela by raising that country's claim to the status of a "controversy" which needed to be settled.

The meeting issued the following communiqué:

In accordance with what had been agreed in the joint communiqué of 7 November 1963, talks took place in London on the 9 and 10 December, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela on the one side and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom and the Premier of British Guiana on the other on the basis of the following agenda: -

Agenda for the continuation at Ministerial levels of Governmental conversations concerning the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom over the frontier with British Guiana in accordance with the joint communiqué of 7 November 1963.

1. Exchange of views on the experts' reports on the examination of documents and discussions of the consequences resulting thereof. Necessity of resolving the dispute.

2. To seek satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy which has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the 1899 Award is null and void.

3. Concrete plans for the collaboration in the development of British Guiana.

4. Determination of time limits for the fulfilment of whatever may be agreed with reference to points one, two and three above.

5. Joint communiqué on the present talks.

In addition to considering the experts' reports on the documentary material relating to the arbitration Award of 1899, the two Ministers considered ways and means of putting an end to the controversy which threatened to damage the traditional cordial relations between Venezuela on the one hand and the United Kingdom and British Guiana on the other.

Ideas and proposals for the practical settlement of the controversy were exchanged. It was agreed that some of these should receive further consideration and that the Ministers should continue the present discussions on the week starting the 13th February, 1966 at Geneva in order to consider these proposals as well as others that might be suggested under the said agenda. Neither side having been able to accept the conclusions of the experts appointed by the other side, Item One will not be considered. It was further agreed that preparatory talks between officials should start at an early date.

The text of this communiqué will be made available to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, sections of the media, on learning of the date of British Guiana's independence had been fixed, launched a strong emotional campaign at home and abroad in support of their country's territorial claims, while at the same time purporting to welcome the independence of their colonial neighbour.

E. GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION TALKS IN BRITISH GUIANA

In British Guiana itself, the publication of the London communiqué brought strong condemnation from Dr. Cheddi Jagan, Leader of the PPP and of the Opposition. He denounced the PNC UF Government for not practising its much touted "consultative democracy" since the Opposition had not been consulted on this vital national issue of Venezuela's claim to the British Guiana's territory. The Premier, Forbes Burnham, then issued a public statement that the PPP would in fact be consulted.

Just a few days before the Geneva Conference was due to be convened, Burnham invited the Deputy Leader of the PPP, Ashton Chase - who was acting for Dr. Jagan then in Moscow attending the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - to discuss the Venezuelan contention and to state the views of the PPP on the border questions with Venezuela and Suriname.

Chase, accompanied by Jocelyn Hubbard, acting Chairman of the party, subsequently met Burnham on Friday 11 February 1966. After the discussions, the Government issued the following statement:

Discussions which took place today between the Prime Minister and members of the Opposition represented by Mr. Ashton Chase and Mr. J. Hubbard lasted for thirty five minutes. There was agreement on both sides that the Venezuelan claim was without substance and that there did not exist any valid claim by Venezuela but rather a controversy.

The PPP delegation emphasised that the border issue was one of national importance and requested that this be treated in like manner. They, therefore, suggested that the delegation going to Geneva should include two representatives from the PPP and their nominees would be either Dr. Jagan who is at the moment in Moscow, or the Deputy Leader, Mr. Ashton Chase, together with Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye.

The Prime Minister indicated that he would have first to consult with his cabinet colleagues before giving an answer.

The Government statement was not first submitted to Chase and Hubbard for approval of its text, and since it failed to mention what the PPP considered to be vital issues raised in the talks, the Party on the 12 February, issued this release:

Mr. Ashton Chase, acting Leader and Mr. H.J.M. Hubbard, acting Chairman, represented the People's Progressive Party at discussions held with the Prime Minister on Friday afternoon on matters relating to Venezuelan and Dutch claims to British Guiana territory.

The People's Progressive Party representatives also stated that their Party's view that the claim be resisted and that it was a national issue in which the Opposition should form part of the British Guiana delegation.

The People's Progressive Party was also of the view that there should be no special arrangements with Venezuela over the development of the area since such special arrangements might compromise the Government of British Guiana in regard to the Venezuelan claim.

The PPP delegation also raised with the Prime Minister the question of the Suriname border issue and expressed the view that this should be dealt with as a national question.

In his booklet entitled Venezuela Border Issue and Occupation of Ankoko - A Sellout by the Coalition Government, published by the PPP in 1967, Jocelyn Hubbard had this to add:

The PPP had requested representation at the Conference by the Leader or Deputy Leader and Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye who had been Attorney General in the People's Progressive Party Government on the legal issues involved in the matter. The PPP had insisted, however, that if only one representative could be accommodated, then that representative would have to be the Leader or the Deputy Leader.

It is important to note that the Government had been warned by the People's Progressive Party delegation that the United Kingdom Government appeared to be letting the talks take a dangerous trend. A spurious claim was listed in the Agenda as a "controversy" needing a solution. The Prime Minister who headed the British Guiana delegation was therefore made fully aware, if he did not know it before, that the talks were headed for a catastrophic climax.

F. PPP DENIED REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA CONFERENCE

The PPP request for representation at the Geneva Conference was refused by the Government which, however, offered to include Dr. Ramsahoye in the Government delegation.

Burnham made this offer to the PPP in the following letter to Ashton Chase dated 12 February 1966:

. . .As promised yesterday, I have consulted my Cabinet colleagues on your request that the Opposition be represented at the forthcoming talks in Geneva on the Venezuela British Guiana boundary.

After careful consideration the Government has decided that it will be prepared to nominate from the Opposition front bench Dr. F.W.H. Ramsahoye as an adviser to the British Guiana delegation. This decision has been taken in the light of the fact that the files and memoranda disclose that Dr. Ramsahoye has been dealing with the matter in great depth during his term as Attorney General and as a result would be a most helpful member of the team.

I confirm my observations of yesterday that there is no difference between the Government and the Opposition on the determination not to yield even the slightest control of any Guyanese territory to the Venezuelans.

Later that same day, Ashton Chase, on behalf of the PPP, replied to Burnham rejecting the offer:

. . .I acknowledge receipt of your letter of today's date.

We made it very clear yesterday that this is primarily a political question, and that the best way to deal with the Venezuelan political manoeuvre was to present a national front in order to cement opinion at home and to influence public opinion.

My Party cannot accept the principle of your Government nominating which member of my party should represent us at the forthcoming talks in Geneva. Your proposal is therefore regarded as a rejection of our wish to have Dr. Jagan (or his deputy) with Mr. Ramsahoye associated with the British Guiana delegation.

It is regretted that following our offer the Government has lost a signal opportunity to demonstrate abroad and at home the united determination of all sections of our community not to yield in any form any part of our territory to Venezuela.

Of interest to note was that the text of Burnham's letter to Chase was released to the press and the radio - without the latter's knowledge and consent - even though that letter was marked "Personal, Secret and Confidential".

No further correspondence or discussion was exchanged between the Government and the Opposition. Subsequently, a PNC UF Government delegation left for Geneva to attend the conference on the 13 February. In great contrast to the British Guiana delegation, the Venezuelan delegation that proceeded to Geneva included representatives from their main Opposition parties, thus presenting a strong united front at the conference.