The Trail Of Diplomacy

• (Chapter 19) The Geneva Agreement
• (Chapter 20) The Invasion of Ankoko
• (Chapter 21) The Kabakaburi Affair
• (Chapter 22) Venezuela's Decree of the Sea
• (Chapter 23) Building up of tension
• (Chapter 24) The Position of the PPP
• (Chapter 25) The Views of the PNC and UF
• (Chapter 26) The Rupununi Revolt
• (Chapter 27) The incident at Eterinbang
• (Chapter 28) The Protocol of Port of Spain

A. POLITICAL VIEWS IN VENEZUELA

Just before the Geneva conference was due to be convened the daily Guiana Graphic on Monday 14 February 1966 carried this report from its foreign correspondent:

Tremendous political pressures have built up in Caracas during the past fortnight on Venezuela's territorial claim to five-eights of British Guiana.

And Venezuelan delegates who on Saturday night flew off to Geneva for this week's discussions with the UK and BG about the border left with their ears ringing with declarations by leading political parties that the land should either be obtained by peaceful means - or it should be seized by force.

The use of force as the ultimate means of "recovering" the land most Venezuelans believe belongs rightly to them is a course of action seriously suggested by many well-known and otherwise responsible political leaders ranging from the official Opposition COPEI - which is backed by the powerful Catholic Church - to the URD, the second largest member of President Leoni's three-party coalition Government.

On the 15 February, the same correspondent reported for the Guiana Graphic: "From the Essequibo eastwards we are willing to be brothers to Guyanese. But west of the Essequibo is a different matter. That land is ours and we demand it."

The man who said that to me was no street corner demagogue. Rather it was one of Venezuela's leading jurists, Dr. Orlando Tovar, Professor at Caracas University, legal adviser to the Venezuelan Government, and - more importantly - spokesman on international affairs for his party, the URD. The URD is the second largest party in President Leoni's three-party coalition Government.

In Caracas itself tension was whipped up. On the 16 February, the day the Geneva Conference opened, there was a demand for the seizure of British properties and holdings in Venezuela if the Venezuelan claim was not recognized. The Guiana Graphic carried this report from Reuter:

It was reported in Caracas yesterday that State Legislators have called for the confiscation of all British properties and holdings in Venezuela if their territorial claim is not recognized. Meeting at Ciudad Bolivar, the Presidents of Venezuela's 20 States signed a declaration asking the Government to consider economic sanctions against Britain if the nation's claim fails.

Undoubtedly, political manoeuvres were made before, during and after the sessions of the Geneva Conference. Significantly, the London Times, a newspaper of great influence, predicted on the 15 February that the Conference would reach a settlement. The Guiana Graphic on the following day reported the prediction of the Times:

The Venezuelan case is clearly, and it may be said, irretrievably weakened by the fact that an award of an Arbitration Court in Paris in 1899 was accepted by both sides as a full, final and perfect settlement.

The paper made the suggestion that the Geneva meeting will reach an agreement - without any cession of territory - upon the joint development by Venezuela and Guyana of a large area of land west of the Essequibo River. This area is known to be rich in mineral resources and an excellent hydro-electric potential exists.

The Financial Times of London hoped that any agreement reached at Geneva would include joint development of the Essequibo region. In its issue of the 15 February, the paper declared that "joint development should make economic sense if it proves politically possible. If this fails the next developments would be unpleasant..."

B. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The two-day Geneva Conference was duly held on the 16 and 17 February 1966.The British Guiana delegation, which teamed up with the British delegation, included Burnham, Minister of State Shridath Ramphal and a team of advisers. On the first day of the Conference, Burnham delivered an exceptionally strong speech in which he told the delegates that British Guiana (and ultimately the new independent state of Guyana) was not prepared to yield even a square inch of soil to Venezuela. The Guiana Graphic correspondent at Geneva, Colin Rickards, in a report on the first day of the Conference, stated:

After the Prime Minister's very positive stand, the Venezuelans shifted from actual discussion of the boundary itself to the question of how they as a friendly nation could show their good neighbourliness by helping to develop the Guyanas through economic aid.

It took the whole day to discuss this. . .

Further discussions continued on the following day with speeches made by the Foreign Ministers of both Great Britain and Venezuela who exchanged numerous suggestions for solving the controversy. The Conference ended later that day with the signing of the following document which became known as the Geneva Agreement:

THE GENEVA AGREEMENT

Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and the Government of Venezuela, Geneva, 17th February, 1966.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and the Government of Venezuela;

Taking into account the forthcoming independence of British Guiana;

Recognising that closer co-operation between British Guiana and Venezuela could bring benefit to both countries;

Convinced that any outstanding controversy between the United Kingdom and British Guiana on the one hand and Venezuela on the other would prejudice the furtherance of such co-operation and should therefore be amicably resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties;

In conformity with the agenda that was agreed for the governmental conversations concerning the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom over the frontier with British Guiana, in accordance with the joint communiqué of 7 November, 1963, have reached the following agreement to resolve the present controversy:

ARTICLE I

A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void.

ARTICLE II

(1) Within two months of the entry into force of this Agreement, two representatives shall be appointed to the Mixed Commission by the Government of British Guiana and two by the Government of Venezuela.

(2) The Government appointing a representative may at any time replace him, and shall do so immediately should one or both of its representatives be unable to act through illness or death or any other cause.

(3) The Mixed Commission may by agreement between the representatives appoint experts to assist the Mixed Commission, either generally or in relation to any individual matter under consideration by the Mixed Commission.

ARTICLE III

The Mixed Commission shall present interim reports at intervals of six months from the date of its first meeting.

ARTICLE IV

(1) If, within a period of four years from the date of this Agreement, the Mixed Commission should not have arrived at a full agreement for the solution of the controversy it shall, in its final report, refer to the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela any outstanding questions. Those Governments shall without delay choose one of the means of peaceful settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(2) If, within three months of receiving the final report, the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela should not have reached agreement regarding the choice of one of the means of settlement provided by Article 33 of the Charter of the United nations, they shall refer the decision as to the means of settlement to an appropriate international organ upon which they both agree or, failing agreement on this point, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If the means so chosen do not lead to a solution of the controversy, the said organ, or as the case may be, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall choose another of the means stipulated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, and so on until the controversy has been resolved or until all the means of peaceful settlement there contemplated have been exhausted.

ARTICLE V

(1) In order to facilitate the greatest possible measure of co-operation and mutual understanding, nothing contained in this Agreement shall be interpreted as renunciation or diminution by the United Kingdom, British Guiana or Venezuela of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana, or of any previously asserted rights of or claims to such territorial sovereignty, or as prejudicing their position as regards their recognition or non-recognition of a right of, claim or basis of claim by any of them to such territorial sovereignty.

(2) No acts or activities taking place while this Agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana or create any rights of sovereignty in those territories, except in so far as such acts or activities result from any agreement reached by the Mixed Commission and accepted in writing by the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in those territories shall be asserted while this Agreement is in force, nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed Commission while that Commission is in being.

ARTICLE VI

The Mixed Commission shall hold its first meeting at a date and place to be agreed between the Governments of British Guiana and Venezuela. This meeting shall take place as soon as possible after its members have been appointed. Thereafter the Mixed Commission shall meet as and when agreed between the representatives.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

ARTICLE VIII

Upon the attainment of independence by British Guiana, the Government of Guyana shall thereafter be a party to this Agreement, in addition to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Venezuela.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Geneva this 17th day of February, 1966 in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authoritative.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

MICHAEL STEWART
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

L.F.S. BURNHAM
Prime Minister of British Guiana

For the Government of Venezuela:

IGNACIO IRIBARREN BORGES
Minister of Foreign Affairs

C. UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER

A joint Communiqué which reflected the decisions and the purpose of the Geneva Agreement was issued immediately after the Agreement was signed.

Shortly after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, Venezuela's Foreign Minister, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, sent a copy of the document in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant. On the 4 April 1966, the Secretary-General replied to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister:

Most Excellent Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the text of the agreement signed in Geneva on the 17th day of February, 1966, by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, the Foreign Relations Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of British Guiana. I have made note of the obligations that eventually can fall on the Secretary-General of the United Nations by virtue of Paragraph 2 of Article IV of the agreement and it pleases me to inform you that the said functions are of such a nature that they can be appropriately carried out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency my highest and most respectful consideration.

(Signed) U Thant

The Geneva Agreement was eventually registered with the UN Secretariat on the 5 May 1966 as an official UN document.

D. VENEZUELAN REACTION TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT

Immediately following the signing of the Geneva Agreement, press reports indicated that the Agreement was well received in Venezuela and most Venezuelan newspapers headlined the decision as a victory for Venezuela's efforts to reach an understanding. La Republica, Venezuela's semi-official daily, on the 18 February greeted the four-year negotiation period as "the re-opening of the controversy". The paper stated that if the decision of 1899 was not annulled at least it would be revised.

And on the 25 February, the Caracas English language paper, The Daily Journal, reported on a press conference given the day before by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister on his return from Geneva: Foreign Minister Ignacio Iribarren Borges yesterday once more pointed out that it had been Great Britain and not Venezuela who had changed her position at the last meeting of the parties in Geneva.

Speaking at a press conference, Iribarren Borges said that the joint communiqué to which Great Britain had subscribed had been drafted originally in London, and that its signature now actually meant that the 1899 decision would be reconsidered.

He also denied rumours that Great Britain was no longer a party to the dispute, pointing out that the agreement to arbitrate had been between Venezuela and Great Britain with British Guiana as a consultant who when it was granted its independence would become a full partner to the agreement.

Questioned as to why British Guiana was dealing directly with Venezuela when it was not an independent body, Iribarren Borges replied that Great Britain had agreed to approve anything signed between British Guiana and Venezuela.

As for the independence and recognition issue, Iribarren Borges said that when British Guiana becomes independent Venezuela may recognise her but not the territory in dispute.

Asked if he had confidence that a new arbitration tribunal would reverse a 70-year decision, the Foreign Minister said he did, and added that Venezuela was not to blame for the size of the territory which was taken from her in 1899 and that was now two-thirds of British Guiana.

Another point raised was whether Venezuela did not fear another "unjust" decision would be rendered, to which the Foreign Minister answered that Venezuela has "valid facts" to prove the 1899 decision to be null and void and it was against that arbitration ruling, not against the institution of arbitration itself.

But the Foreign Minister refused to term the recent Geneva meeting as a "diplomatic triumph" for Venezuela, saying that as head of the delegation that went to that talks, it would be improper for him to say so. . .

E. STATEMENT BY THE PPP

In British Guiana, the PPP, in a response to the signing of the Geneva Agreement, issued the following statement on the 19 February 1966:

In the light of the decisions of the Geneva Conference on the British Guiana-Venezuela border issue, the People's Progressive Party wishes to denounce the so-called settlement for the reasons that it gives substance and status to a spurious claim that has no legal basis and also compromises the sovereignty of this country by associating an aggressor Government in a special arrangement in relation to the territory which is the subject of controversy and the basis for a threat of aggression.

It should be noted that the present Government of British Guiana had declared that it would refuse to recognise that Venezuela had any claim to territory in British Guiana. In discussions with representatives of the PPP, the Prime Minister had also said that the British Guiana Government would not agree to any arrangements for the joint development of the territory claimed by Venezuela on conditions which would give to that country any special rights or imply any special status for Venezuela in relation to the territory claimed. The PPP had sought representation at the Conference with the object of strengthening the Government's bargaining power by presenting a united front.

The British Guiana Government has yielded ground at the Conference on both of these vital issues with the result that Guyana is committed to joint action with Venezuela in seeking a solution to a dispute which has no legal basis but which is now given international status. In addition to this, Venezuela appears to have been given special consideration with regard to the exploitation of the natural resources of what that country calls Guyana-Essequibo - the territory which is the object of the claim. These conclusions are borne out by the Conference Communiqué and by press comments in Venezuela.

The PPP is most unhappy over the outcome of the Conference and declares its determination to work steadfastly and strenuously for reversals of the decisions of the Geneva Conference in so far as they prejudice the interests of the people of Guyana and threaten our country's territorial integrity.

In his booklet, Venezuela Border Issue and Occupation of Ankoko - A Sellout by the Coalition Government, (published by the PPP in 1967), Jocelyn Hubbard, an executive member of the PPP, pointed out that "one of the features of the agreement which is of utmost importance is the decision that Britain shall remain party to the Agreement after independent Guyana comes into being. This clearly reveals the political nature of the Agreement since independent Guyana should inherit all Britain's rights and obligations in respect of Guyanese territory on the attainment of independence".

The PNC-UF coalition Government, on the other hand, welcomed the Agreement, and on the 5 March 1966, Prime Minister Burnham insisted that there was no question of the Geneva Agreement being regarded by his Government as a compromise on Guyana's territorial integrity. Interestingly, in a separate comment, Attorney General Shridath Ramphal admitted that the Agreement "became a requisite to independence".

However, PPP Leader, Dr. Jagan, who returned to British Guiana in early March from abroad, declared that the Geneva Conference had only shelved the issue until it was expedient to raise it again.

A resolution to approve the Geneva Agreement was tabled in the British Guiana House of Assembly during April. In a general debate on the 28 April, the Government and the Opposition disagreed strongly, but it was finally approved with the PPP voting against.

F. POLITICAL MANOEUVRES BEHIND THE SCENE

Obviously, there were political influences at work long before the Geneva Agreement was worked out. The political manoeuvres leading up to the signing of the Agreement were explained explicitly in the New York Times of the 22 February 1966:

Venezuela undoubtedly was concerned at the possibility that Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan might return to power and make independent Guyana a base for Marxist subversion against its neighbours.

The agreement on the boundary question after a two-day conference in Geneva will bolster the prestige of Premier Forbes Burnham's coalition Government at an opportune time and remove at least one major problem from its very full plate.

With this report, the New York Times, no doubt, was deliberately throwing the task on Venezuela to carry out the US State Department manoeuvre to prevent a progressive government under the PPP from coming to power in an independent Guyana. This political manoeuvre was therefore aimed at making Guyana available to the United States as a base to carry out its destabilising plans against any pro-socialist government in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Then on the 24 February 1966 the authoritative pro-government Venezuelan newspaper, La Republica, in a most revealing statement in an editorial, showed very clearly the pro-imperialist reason for the settlement in Geneva. The paper said that Venezuela should not force the frontier issue with British Guiana to a point which might cause the overthrow of the Government of the Burnham Government. The editorial revealed that the four-year period agreed on for the negotiations between Venezuela and the shortly-to-be independent Guyana was a concession by Venezuela which demanded that in return Britain and British Guiana should recognise the Venezuelan case in depth and agree to discuss it. In effect, according to the editorial, both Britain and British Guiana agreed to the Venezuelan demand.

La Republica added: We have already said that in this kind of negotiations one cannot be inflexible. Besides, the original proposition of the British Guianese delegation was for a period of twenty years.

We must not lose sight either of certain political requirements which suggested yielding on this point. The Government of Burnham is pursued by extremist adversaries. . .

To force the situation on the part of Venezuela could precipitate a popular reaction in Guyana capable of pulling down a Government which identifies itself with ours in the defence of democratic principles and in struggle against extremist aggression. . .

G. INTERPRETING THE AGREEMENT

The aim of the Geneva Agreement was to afford Venezuela an opportunity in essentially a bilateral context to have examined its contention of nullity of the 1899 Award. (Venezuela has never managed to establish such a contention).

In the maintenance by Venezuela of its claim, the Geneva Agreement was also a logical part of the process of examination of documentary material to establish nullity, the onus being on Venezuela to produce such evidence. But there was an important difference. The Geneva Agreement unlike "an offer" was now an international Treaty which was legally binding. Thus the Geneva Agreement provided an agreed legal mechanism for continuing the process started in 1963, that is, of examining the Venezuelan contention of nullity of the 1899 Award.

The provisions of the Geneva Agreement also maintained the position taken by the British in 1962, that is, the Agreement was in no way related to substantive talks about the revision of the frontier. The Geneva Agreement was therefore a legal basis for dealing with the political situation caused by Venezuelan revanchism in asserting and maintaining a claim to two-thirds of Guyana's territory.

From the beginning, Venezuela ignored the main role of the Agreement. Under the Geneva Agreement a Mixed Commission was established to deal with the Venezuelan contention of nullity of the 1899 Award. The Commission was given a maximum of four (4) years to complete its task. At the very first meeting of the Commission the Venezuelan Commissioners were invited by their Guyanese counterparts to produce evidence to support their contention of nullity. However, the Venezuelans took the position that the Commission should not be concerned with such a question but rather with the revision of the frontier. The Mixed Commission in subsequent meetings was unable to fulfil its mandate largely because Venezuela declined to deal with the question of their contention of the nullity of the 1899 Award.

Venezuela consistently misinterpreted the Geneva Agreement which appointed the Mixed Commission comprised of Guyanese and Venezuelans and given a period of four years to carry out a certain mandate. That mandate contained in Article I of the Geneva Agreement specified:

"A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void".

During the existence of the Mixed Commission, the Venezuela representatives refused to face the fact that the central issue was the contention of their Government of the nullity of the 1899 Award.

The Venezuela argument and actions during the term of the Mixed Commission were designed to have a discussion on the revision of the frontier. However, the Geneva Agreement never allowed for such a demand.

In citing the Geneva Agreement, especially Article I, the Government of Venezuela attempted at subsequent meetings of the Mixed Commission to limit the scope and application of the Geneva Agreement. Venezuelan officials emphasised on the words "the practical settlement of the controversy" to the exclusion of all other phrases in the relevant provisions. Shortly after, they began to described the issue as a "territorial controversy". However, Guyana stated that there was no "territorial controversy" - only a controversy over the contention by Venezuela of the invalidity of that the Arbitral Award of 1899. According to the Guyana Government, in any discussion with a view to finding a solution to any controversy, Venezuela must agree that the prior issue to be discussed was its contention of the nullity of the 1899 Award. (Actually, Venezuela has never proven before any international tribunal the nullity of the Award).

H. ARTICLE 33 OF THE UN CHARTER

Significantly, the Geneva Agreement recommended that both Venezuela and Guyana should revert to Article 33 of the United Nations Charter to bring about a peaceful solution to the issue. Article 33 states:

1. The parties of any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means.

Of interest to note is that a corollary of Article 33 seems to be reflected in Article 36 (3) of the UN Charter. This Article which is of significance to matters like the Guyana-Venezuela border issue, specifies:

In making recommendations under this Article, the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Interestingly, the Geneva Agreement did not specify what should follow if all the means of peaceful settlement, as specified in Article 33 (as well as Article 36) of the UN Charter had been tried and had failed to produce a solution.

I. THE MIXED COMMISSION

With the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the Mixed Commission, formed of representatives of the Governments of British Guiana and Venezuela, was established. The Venezuelan appointees were Dr. Luis Loreto and Dr. Garcia Bustillos, while those appointed by British Guiana were Sir Donald Jackson and Dr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen. The Venezuelan advisers to the Commission were General Luis Ordonez, Padre Hermann Gonzalez-Oropeza, Padre Pablo Ojer-Celigueta, Dr. Luis Herera Campins (later to become President of Venezuela in 1980), Captain Euclides Russian and Dr. Oscar Arnal Nunez. Shirley Patterson (later to be known as Shirley Filed-Ridley) was the lone adviser of British Guiana to the Commission.

The Commission held its first meeting in Caracas in July 1966 and the second in Georgetown in September 1966. Two months before the first meeting, on the 26 May, British Guiana became the independent state of Guyana and, thus, became a full partner to the Geneva Agreement.

As stipulated by the Geneva Agreement a Sub-Commission of experts was also established. Its members were Dr. Oscar Arnal Nunez, Dr. Pedro Pablo Azpurua and Dr. Rivas Casado of Venezuela and Shirley Patterson of Guyana. This Sub-Commission did not hold its first meeting until January 1968.

Meanwhile, at around the same period when the Mixed Commission was being established, rumours were rife in that Venezuela was covertly interfering in Guyanese internal affairs especially aimed at undermining the loyalty of the Amerindian population in the Essequibo region of the country. In May 1966, just before the independence celebrations, a political party called the Guyana Amerindian Party was launched. It was headed by a former leading Amerindian member of the PNC, Anthony Chaves. This party, which did not survive for long since it failed to attract support, was suspected of being funded by Venezuela.

I. NOTE OF RECOGNITION FROM VENEZUELA

With Guyana becoming a fully independent nation on the 26 May 1966, Venezuela was one of the first countries to formally recognise the establishment of the new State. However, it must be noted that on the day before, a Communiqué issued by the Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated that it would not recognise Guyana's control over the western Essequibo. (This was to be later repeated by the Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister in a statement on the 16 September).

The Venezuelan Government, through its Foreign Minister, Ignacio Iribarren Borges, sent this Note of Recognition on Guyana's Independence Day to the Guyanese Minister of External Affairs, Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham:

Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Republic of Venezuela, considering that this 26th day of May, 1966 has been proclaimed the independence of the State of Guyana, has decided, with special pleasure, to grant it its recognition with the reservation that is explained in this Note.

The Government of Venezuela entrusts me to express through Your Excellency its cordial greetings to Her Majesty Elizabeth II, and to Honourable Mr. Forbes L. Burnham, Prime Minister of that friendly nation.

Under these circumstances, the Government of the Republic of Venezuela wishes to establish relations with the State of Guyana on the basis of common interest and mutual respect, and is willing to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Government of Your Excellency, whenever both countries deem it convenient.

The Government of Venezuela, recognising the new independent State of Guyana, wishes to express the joy which overcomes all the National Community when witnessing the birth of a new country on American soil upon the old vestiges of colonialism, thus incorporating its strong and hard working inhabitants into the community of free nations of the world.

According to the Agreement subscribed at Geneva, on the 17th February, 1966 between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, this latter in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and by virtue of Article VIII of the aforesaid Agreement, as of today the 26th May, 1966, the Government of Your Excellency becomes part of the referred to Agreement.

Consequently, in view of what is stipulated in Article V of the said Agreement, the recognition that Venezuela makes to the new State of Guyana, does not imply on the part of our country waiver or reduction of the claimed territorial rights, nor in any manner does it affect the sovereign rights which emerge from the claim risen by the Venezuelan contention that the so-called 1899 Paris Arbitral Award about the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary is null and void.

Therefore, Venezuela recognises as territory of the new State the one which is located on the east of the right bank of the Essequibo River, and reiterates before the new State, and before the international community, that it expressly reserves its rights of territorial sovereignty over all the zone located on the west bank of the above-mentioned river. Therefore, the Guyana-Essequibo territory over which Venezuela expressly reserves its sovereign rights, limits on the east by the new State of Guyana, through the middle line of the Essequibo River, beginning from its source and on to its mouth in the Atlantic Ocean.

The Government of Venezuela expresses its sincere wishes so that the exercise of activities of the Government of Your Excellency shall become a source of benefits for the sister nation.

I make use of this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the testimony of my highest and distinguished esteem.

(Signed) Ignacio Iribarren Borges
Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Venezuela

J. REPLY TO THE VENEZUELAN NOTE FROM GUYANA

The Guyana Government eventually replied to the Venezuelan Note of Recognition in a letter to the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 19 August 1966:

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 26th May, 1966, the date of the proclamation of Independence of the State of Guyana, and to put on record, in the name of the people of Guyana, our esteem for the expression of faith and hope formulated by the Venezuelan Government in the feeling that the action taken by the Guyana Government will lead to countless benefits.

My Government takes note of the pleasure with which the Government of Venezuela has granted its recognition of Guyana, but observes, with regret, that the Government of Venezuela has delineated the middle line of the Essequibo as the western boundary of the State of Guyana which is in contradiction with the 1905 agreement, being the result of the work of the Boundary Commission, which laid out and delineated the boundary west of the Colony of British Guiana along the rivers, Cuyuni and Wenamo.

In this respect I desire to point out that Article I (2) of the Guyana Constitution stipulates that the territory of Guyana embraces all that area, which immediately before the 26th May, 1966, comprised the old Colony of British Guiana, together with the area which by Act of Parliament may be declared as part of the territory of Guyana. The territory which extends between the middle line of the Essequibo on the east and the boundary of the old Colony of British Guiana all along the rivers Cuyuni and Wanamo on the west, was already included on the 26th May, 1966, judicially and administratively, within the old Colony of British Guiana and forms part of the State of Guyana.

Your Excellency's Note refers to the Geneva Agreement of 1966. I wish to assure the Government of Your Excellency that the Government of Guyana intends, in conformity with well established international practice, to carry out all obligations of the said Agreement.

We have noted the desire of the Venezuelan Government to interchange at the proper time, diplomatic representatives.

Because of our limitations in so far as trained personnel and our limited financial resources, the Government of Guyana regrets the fact that it does not find it possible at this time to establish a diplomatic mission in Venezuela. However, the Government of Guyana would receive any decision on the part of the Government of Your Excellency to raise the actual Consulate-General of Venezuela in Georgetown to the status of Embassy and appoint, whenever it is convenient, an Ambassador to represent Venezuela in the State of Guyana.

We appreciate the greetings of Venezuela's satisfaction because Guyana has at last freed itself from colonialism, and I desire to ratify to the Government of Venezuela the assurance that Guyana will join its efforts with all nations of the world in search of peace and democracy as well as in the opposition to all the remainder of colonialism or intention to install it.

(Signed) L.F.S. Burnham
Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs

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Matters surrounding the seizure by Venezuela of Guyana's half of Ankoko Island reached a stalemate after October 1966. The Guyana Government refused to raise the issue in the UN Security Council, and Guyana's representatives on the Mixed Commission (established by the Geneva Agreement earlier in the year) refused to raise the issue at the third meeting of the Commission held in Caracas in December of that year.

A. MEETING OF AMERINDIAN CHIEFS

Relations between the two countries simmered down for a while. But on 14 April 1967 the Guyana government announced that a meeting of Amerindian chiefs held at Kabakaburi on the Pomeroon River (in the western Essequibo area claimed by Venezuela), a Venezuelan diplomat and the British husband of a Guyanese Amerindian participated and carried out subversive activities relating to the border controversy with Venezuela. The government claimed that the chiefs were influenced by these persons to move a resolution in favour of "joint development" by Guyana and Venezuela of the western Essequibo region.

One week later, the chiefs were summoned to Georgetown for a meeting with the Minister responsible for local government and Amerindian affairs. At the end of this meeting, they issued a statement denying that they had advocated joint development, and insisted that they were always loyal to the Guyana government. But the fact remained that the chiefs indeed passed the resolution as was indicated in the Government's announcement of 14 April, and it was widely believed that they were pressured to issue the denial at the meeting with the minister.

The Amerindian Association, whose Chairman was Stephen Campbell, a United Force Member of Parliament and a member of the coalition Government, was alleged to have organised the meeting of Amerindian Chiefs at Kabakaburi, but this was later denied by the Association.

B. EXPULSION OF VENEZELAN DIPLOMAT

There was much mystery surrounding the Kabakaburi meeting, and all that Guyanese were told was that the police authorities were carrying out investigations. Eventually, an Englishman, Michael Wilson, was arrested and while he was in detention, amendments to the Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance were rushed through a specially summoned meeting of the National Assembly. These amendments gave the government additional powers to deport any non-Guyanese in the interest of "good order" by removing the conditions that persons facing deportation should first be placed before the courts.

On 27 April 1967, Wilson was deported to the United Kingdom where the British police gave him a rigorous searching and questioning. In a comment on Wilson's involvement of what the Guyana authorities considered to be undesirable political activities among the Amerindians, the Sun, the newspaper of the United Force, described Wilson on 29 April as a "European well known for his far-left tendencies".

Then on Sunday, 1 May 1967, Leopoldo Talyhardat, Vice-Consul for Venezuela in Guyana, returned to Venezuela after the Guyana Government declared that he was "unacceptable". Here again, there was mystery surrounding his departure, but newspaper reports indicated that he was linked with the Kabakaburi conference.

The Guyana Government closed the incident with the following statement to the press on 1 May:

". . .The Government of Guyana regards the Government of Venezuela as its friend. This was stated this morning by the Principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Information. He said that Guyana wishes at all times to maintain friendly relations with neighbouring Venezuela and the question of Señor Leopoldo Talyhardat being unacceptable to the Government should not be regarded as an indication of any new policy on the part of Guyana towards Venezuela."

The government carefully avoided stating directly that Talyhardat had interfered in Guyanese affairs. However, there was no doubt that his expulsion was due to his involvement in the Kabakaburi affair which was regarded by the Guyana government as a clandestine attempt by Venezuelan diplomatic personnel to interfere in the internal affairs of Guyana through the subversion of members of Guyana's indigenous Amerindian community.

C. SIGNS OF DIVISIONS IN THE COALITION

It must be noted that throughout the "Kabakaburi Affair", the Prime Minister had no consultations with the Leader of the Opposition, a situation which was heavily criticised by the PPP.

It was about this time that the Guyana Minister of Finance and Leader of the United Force, Peter D'Aguiar, announced that he would be visiting Venezuela with a party of Guyanese to engage in mountain-climbing. The PPP was sharply critical of D'Aguiar's plans, especially since he was a leading member of the Government. The Party in a statement on 19 May 1967 suggested that with the recent exposure of the Kabakaburi affair and the expulsion of a Venezuelan diplomat, D'Aguiar's visit to Venezuela was an impropriety which was likely to embarrass the Government of which he was a member. The United Force's newspaper, the Sun, expressed annoyance with the PPP statement with this revealing comment:

". . .It is no secret that the Venezuelan claim to this country is made out of fear of Jagan and his friends in Cuba with their terrorist bombs, and their friends in the Soviet Union with their rockets, plus addition to the vast army of socialist "scholarship winners" training in the Soviet Union, and awaiting their chance to come home and take over. Jagan is a perpetual embarrassment to the people of Guyana."

The PNC newspaper, the New Nation, on the same day took a different view when it stated:

. . . Any neighbour who claims half of our household is no friend of ours. We must respect the forms of international comity but we must never go out of our way to accommodate those who seek to despoil us. This is the advice to every citizen whether he is a member of the Cabinet or trade union. . .

In a comment on the statements of the UF and the PNC newspapers, the PPP-supportive Mirror on 23 May 1967 had this to say:

"All these facts suggest that Venezuela is not merely playing a cat and mouse game with the People's Progressive Party as the United Force suggests. After all, one of Mr. Burnham's first tasks as Prime Minister was to visit Venezuela and hold talks with the top leaders of the Government of that country. Whatever may be the reality underlying Venezuela's claim to Guyanese territory there can be little doubt that the coalition parties do not see eye to eye on the matter."

D. VENEZUELAN PATTERN OF HOSTILITY

Meanwhile, Guyana was attempting to gain greater access in international organisations, but was finding that such access was not always very easy due to opposition from Venezuela. On 23 May, three days before Guyana's first independence anniversary, Guyana's Ambassador to the USA and the UN, John Carter, asked the Venezuelan Government to withdraw its claim to Guyana's territory so that Guyana could join the Organisation of American States (OAS). (The OAS Charter at that time precluded any country having a territorial dispute with a member-state from being accepted as a new member). However, Venezuela refused this request and maintained that its claim to the western Essequibo was just, and that Guyana's entry to the OAS could not be considered because of the existing territorial "dispute".

In relation to this matter, the Trinidad Guardian on 23 May made this editorial comment: ". . .This must be discouraging if not unexpected news for Guyana's Prime Minister, Mr. Burnham, and for other countries in the region. Further, it would appear that the Amerindians in the disputed areas are not wholly in support of the Guyana Government.

"This is a conclusion which can be drawn from the need to deport an alien, to exclude a Guyanese from the area, from the ousting of a foreign diplomat. All are accused of tampering with the Amerindians."

Throughout 1967, the Guyana Government's refrained from stating that the expelled Venezuelan diplomat was asked to leave Guyana because of his subversive activities among Guyanese Amerindians during that year. However, this was finally admitted by the Ministry of External Affairs in its information publication, Guyana Journal, Volume 1, Number 2 (published in December 1968) which wrote about the "pattern of hostility" of the Venezuelan Government and mentioned a number of previously unpublicised "hostile" actions against Guyana. The publication also implied that more than one Venezuelan diplomat was involved in the subversive activities. The Guyana Journal wrote:

". . . . This studied programme of treaty violation is only part of the pattern of hostility and aggression mounted by Venezuela against Guyana. Thus Venezuela has asserted her claim to stop Guyana from becoming a Member of the Organisation of American States. She has used her claim to bar Guyana from signing the Latin American Treaty of Denuclearisation. Despite repeated requests to the depository government that the date be set for Guyana to sign the treaty in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2286 and the express understanding of many delegations who spoke during the debate on that resolution, Guyana has not yet been permitted to sign.

"Venezuela has similarly used her claim to enter reservations against Guyana's participation at FAO Conferences, at the Pan American Conference on Roads, and on Guyana's accession to the International Telecommunication Convention, Montreaux, (Switzerland) in 1965.

"More recently, but less successfully, Venezuela in furtherance of her territorial ambitions attempted at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in April of this year (1968) to dilute the provisions of the International Law Commission's draft Convention dealing with the sanctity of treaties.

"Nor has this campaign been limited to external action. In 1966 Venezuelan diplomatic personnel in Guyana were engaged in a clandestine attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Guyana through the subversion of members of Guyana's indigenous Amerindian community. As a result a second Secretary of the Venezuelan Embassy in Georgetown, Sñr. Talyhardat was expelled."

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No doubt, the Kabakaburi affair and the expulsion of the Venezuelan diplomat caused a deterioration in relations between Guyana and Venezuela. This later (in early 1968) led to the Guyana Government's refusal to continue to grant the Venezuelan Embassy radio time to broadcast a weekly 15 minute cultural and information programme which it had been doing on a Guyanese radio station for the past two years.

However, meetings at official level continued. But whatever caused a meeting of the Mixed Commission which commenced in Georgetown on the 30 October 1967 to be abruptly adjourned on the 6 November, when the Venezuelan delegation withdrew from the meeting, was not made known to the public. The Venezuelans eventually returned to continue discussions on the 28 November and the session ended on the 1 December.

Another session was held during December in Caracas with the main purpose to draft an Interim Report to be presented to the Venezuelan, Guyanese and British Governments, in keeping with the terms of the Geneva Agreement.

At the end of another meeting of the Mixed Commission held from the 1 to 4 July 1968 in the Venezuelan capital, Venezuela announced that it was withdrawing from the Sub Commission of experts established by the Mixed Commission, and claimed that by this action the Sub Commission was dissolved. At the time of this announcement, the Sub Commission had held only two meetings - the first from the 30 January to the 5 February 1968 and the other from the 5 June to the 17 June the same year. Both meetings were held in Georgetown.

A. STATEMENT BY GUYANA

In a statement on the Venezuelan withdrawal from the Sub Commission, the Guyana Ministry of External Affairs pointed out that Venezuela wished to raise territorial issues straight away in the Mixed Commission. However, Guyana took the view that the correctness of the existing boundary could not be discussed unless Venezuela first make good in the Mixed Commission its contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899, under which that boundary had been established, was null and void. This Venezuela had persistently refused to do and, as further progress could not be made on this issue, at the request of Venezuela, the parties agreed, without prejudice to their stand on it, to consider proposals for cooperation in development between the two countries. Guyana made it clear that such development should relate to its territory as a whole and not to any particular part of it. On this clear understanding the Mixed Commission set up the Sub Commission "to study possible areas of cooperation between Venezuela and Guyana".

At the second meeting of the Sub Commission which was held in June 1968, Guyana submitted proposals relating to three specific projects. Venezuela recognized the priority of these projects on technical grounds but rejected all of them because in its view, priority should be given to projects relating to territory it was claiming. In fact, Venezuela was demanding that cooperation in development should be limited to the western Essequibo region and, further, that it should be given extensive rights to joint administration over the joint development of the area. Such demands clearly threatened to impair Guyana's sovereignty over the area. They were inconsistent with the basis on which the Sub Commission was established.

In the circumstances, Guyana refused to accede to the Venezuelan demands and, because of this, Venezuela withdrew from the Sub Commission and claimed that in consequence the Sub Commission was dissolved. In the Guyana view, Venezuela's unilateral decision could only take effect as a withdrawal and could not dissolve the Sub Commission since this body was created by a decision of the whole of the Mixed Commission.

B. ECONOMIC AGGRESSION BY VENEZUELA

On Saturday 15 June 1968, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed an advertisement in the London Times stating that the Essequibo region of Guyana belonged to Venezuela, and that the Venezuelan Government would not in consequence recognise concessions granted in the region by the Guyana Government. The advertisement was in the following terms:

COMMUNIQUE FROM THE VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Venezuelan Government, through an official statement issued by the Department of Geology and Mines (Ministry of Forestry, Lands and Mines) of the Guyana Government has learnt that with the help, in equipment and personnel of the United Nations and the United States of America, mine operations have recently been intensified in various parts of Esequivo Guiana.

In view of the fact that the Esequivo Guiana is claimed by our country, as by rights belong to it, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly and categorically once more state that they do not recognise any type of such supposed concessions either granted or to be granted by the Guyana Government over the territory stretching to the west of the Esequivo River, from its source to its mouth, and this respect, they reiterate the Communiqué issued by the said Ministry and published in the press on the 25th May, 1966, as well as the statement given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, on the 16 September of that same year. These and other reservations which derive from the unwavering Venezuelan right over the Esequivo Guiana were upheld by the Geneva Agreement (Article V) of the 17th February, 1966. Caracas, 14 May, 1968.

C. NOTE OF PROTEST BY GUYANA

On the 28 June 1968, the Guyana Government sent a Note of Protest to the Venezuelan Government. It stated:

...In seeking through the medium of an advertisement in space bought from the publishers of the Times newspaper to assert a claim to the region of Guyana west of the Essequibo River, the Government of Venezuela has again acted in violation. . . of the Geneva Agreement. . .

Further, the Government of Guyana views the aforementioned advertisement as a deliberate attempt by the Government of Venezuela to retard the economic development of Guyana through the intimidation of persons, organisations or Governments genuinely prepared to contribute to the development of Guyana and to the advancement of the economic well being of its people. The Government of Guyana cannot but view this attempt as being entirely inconsistent with the professed desire of the Government of Venezuela to assist in the development of Guyana and to contribute to the advancement of the welfare of its people. The Government of Guyana is under solemn obligation to the people of Guyana and is pledged to the development of all the resources of the country for the benefit of its people. As a Government of one of the newly independent States of the Western Hemisphere and of one of the small developing countries of the world, the Government of Guyana places on record to the Government of Venezuela its protest against this new violation of the Geneva Agreement and this act of economic aggression.

The region of Guyana west of the Essequibo River is an area whose boundary with Venezuela has been established under an international arbitral award by which the Government of Venezuela is bound. That area has been consistently under the sovereignty and under the active administrative and juridical possession and control of the Government of Guyana, and before Guyana's independence on the 26th May, 1966, of the Government of the United Kingdom for over 150 years and, more specifically, ever since the determination of the boundary with Venezuela under international procedures in 1899. The Government of Guyana and the Government of the United Kingdom have at all material times granted concessions over this territory west of the Essequibo River and until Guyana's independence such concessions have never been questioned by the Government of Venezuela.

The Government of Guyana wishes to state unequivocally that nothing in the Geneva Agreement prohibits or restrains the Government of Guyana from continuing to grant concessions over any part of the territory within its existing boundaries and that nothing in the Geneva Agreement upholds or sustains what are alleged in the aforementioned advertisement to be "reservations which derive from the unwavering Venezuelan right over the Esequivo Guiana". The Government of Guyana rejects all assertions, whether contained in the said advertisement or otherwise, which suggest either expressly or by implication that the Geneva Agreement in any way curtails or restricts the sovereignty of the Government of Guyana over any part of its territory.

Despite the Guyana statement, two North American oil companies, Continental and Globe, which had been granted mining concessions in the Essequibo region of Guyana, gave up these mining rights and closed down their exploration operations. It was clear that these companies which held business connections with oil companies operating in Venezuela succumbed to intimidation following the publication of the Venezuelan advertisement.

D. VENEZUELAN DECREE OF THE SEA

Venezuelan economic aggression increased tremendously on the 9 July 1968 when Dr. Raul Leoni, President of Venezuela, issued a Decree which purported to annex as part of the territorial waters and contiguous zone of Venezuela, a twelve mile belt of sea lying along the coast of Guyana between the mouth of the Essequibo River and Waini Point, and requiring the Venezuelan armed forces to impose domination over that belt of sea.

It must be noted that this belt of sea became since 1954 internationally recognized as owned by Guyana when by the British Guiana (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council made by the Queen in Council of the United Kingdom, Guyana's territory was extended seawards to cover the entire continental shelf.

The Venezuelan Decree, which was published in the Official Gazette of Venezuela, proclaimed the following:

RAUL LEONI, President of the Republic by virtue of the power conferred on him by the National Constitution, and in conformity with the Law of the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Protection of Fishing and Air Space and with the approbative Law of the Convention on the Continental Shelf:

CONSIDERING: That Article 2 of the Law on the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Protection of Fishing and Air Space, and Article 4 and subsequent articles of the Ratifying Law of the Convention of the Continental Shelf, provide that in places where the conditions of the Continental seaboard and islands require it, straight line bases should be drawn by which the extent of the Territorial Sea should be measured:

CONSIDERING: That in many areas along the Venezuelan coastline there exist geographical conditions which require the fixing of such lines along sections of the Republic. It is decreed:

ARTICLE 1. - The following straight baseline shall be drawn on that part of the Venezuelan coast between the dividing line of the Essequibo River and Punta Araguapiche in the Federal District Delta Amacuro from a point with the coordinates 9 degrees 27 minutes 30 seconds North latitude and 60 degrees 52 minutes West longitude to another point with the coordinates 8 degrees 26 minutes North latitude and 59 degrees 34 minutes 30 seconds West longitude.

ARTICLE 2. - The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone corresponding to Venezuela in the sector is measured from the straight baseline where it has been drawn and from the low water mark along the remainder of its length with the exception contained in Article 4.

ARTICLE 3. - The rights of sovereignty of Venezuela over the territorial waters, the restitution of which is claimed from Guyana are expressly reserved, that is to say, that 3 mile wide strip along the coastline of the territory between the mouth of the Essequibo River and the mouth of the Guainia River as well as over the internal waters of the said zone delimited by the straight baseline fixed by the present decree.

ARTICLE 4. - The straight baseline corresponding to the mouth of the Essequibo River will be that which shall be agreed upon in due course with the neighbouring state.

ARTICLE 5. - The Official Notes that are published hereafter will make clear the measures adopted by the present decree,

ARTICLE 6. - The Ministers of External Affairs, Defence, Public Works, Agriculture and Communications shall be charged with the execution of the present decree.

EXPLANATORY NOTE. - This decree by the National Executive, according to official information, has the following significance: The territorial sea of Venezuela is 12 miles wide, in accordance with Venezuelan law, and Guyana's is only three miles. In other words, the three mile area measuring from the coast of the territory under dispute presently pertains to Guyana, the remaining nine miles are considered by Guyana as "high seas". For Venezuela, as a natural consequence of her claim, this very strip is Venezuelan territory in which her sovereignty must be exercised, but before taking any material act of possession, Venezuela has to make public her title to dominion over the waters in question. And she can do so on the basis of the treatise of the straight baseline in the zone and in accordance with Venezuelan law and international conventions. In this way the Venezuelan State should exercise concrete acts of sovereignty in relation, for example, to the petroleum oil concessions which Guyana has granted in the area.

E. A VENEZUELAN COMMENT

Shortly after the Decree was published, a Reuter report on the 9 July quoted Miguel Zuniaga Cisneros, a member of the Guyana Recuperation Committee in Caracas, as saying that the Venezuelan armed forces should seize the western Essequibo and the offshore waters to prevent a "Communist takeover" which he expected following the up coming general elections at year end. Zuniaga felt sure that the Marxist oriented PPP of Cheddi Jagan would win the elections and warned that Venezuela might lose the territory altogether with the "United States taking over the land if a Communist Government takes command of Guyana".

F. STATEMENT BY BURNHAM

On the day after the Decree was published, Guyana's Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, made a brief press statement condemning the Venezuelan action. On the morning of the 12 July he conferred with the Deputy Leader of the PPP, Ashton Chase, on the new situation, and in the afternoon, he addressed the National Assembly (Parliament) on the issue.

After reviewing the history of the Venezuelan claim to Guyana's territory, Burnham showed how Venezuela frustrated the work of the Mixed Commission and the Sub Commission and violated the Geneva Agreement. He revealed that Venezuela had on several occasions made territorial reservations in relation to Guyana's participation in various international meetings. One of the most serious instances of this, he said, was the major effort undertaken by Venezuela to prevent Guyana from signing the Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty. In addition, in April 1968, Venezuela attempted at the Vienna Conference of Treaties to dilute the provisions of the International Law Commission's draft Convention dealing with the sanctity of treaties.

Burnham continued:

...Now comes the preposterous Decree signed on the 9th instant by the President of Venezuela. The Decree is, we contend, a nullity and will be exposed for the unprecedented absurdity that it is. Whatever positions individual countries may take in relation to the breadth of territorial sea, it is palpably clear that only one state may possess sovereignty over the territorial sea relating to the same coast.

If this needed demonstration, it is shown by Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which provides that "the sovereignty of a State extends beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea". Venezuela signed the Convention on the 30th October, 1958, and ratified it on the 15 August, 1961, without any reservations relating to that Article. Indeed such reservations as there were related to Trinidad, Aruba and Curacao. The Convention itself came into force on the 10th September, 1964. Unless and until a decision in favour of Venezuela is forthcoming under the procedure of the Geneva Agreement, Guyana's sovereignty over the generally recognised continental shelf and territorial seas cannot be disturbed. Indeed, Venezuela has at all material times heretofore recognised Guyana's sovereignty over the territorial waters in relation to the coastline in question, and she cannot claim sovereignty over territorial waters relating to the same coastline.

In fact, by the same Convention all signatories to it specifically accept that where states are adjacent to each other the territorial sea of each cannot extend laterally beyond a line projecting seawards from the common land boundary. There are differences of opinion as to how the line should be defined but there is no dispute as to the general principle involved that two States may not both have sovereignty at the same time over the territorial sea (whatever the limit) relating to the same coast. The reason for this is apparent when it is recognised that the doctrine relating to the territorial sea finds its origin in the requirements of security of the coastal State, in the furthering of its commercial, fiscal and political interests and the right of its people to the exclusive exploitation and enjoyment of the products of the sea within its territorial waters.

There is yet another fundamental question which the Venezuelan Decree entirely ignores or callously disregards. It is indisputable that Guyana's territory extends seawards to cover the entire continental shelf and Guyana has consistently exercised sovereignty over it. Since the ownership of the territorial sea includes ownership of the sea bed, the Venezuelan Decree purports to relate to part of the continental shelf which is within the dominion of Guyana. Insofar, therefore, as the Venezuelan Decree was based, as it is expressed to be based, on the assumption that Guyana's sovereignty extends only three miles seawards, the Decree was founded on a false premise.

If further evidence be needed of the degree to which the Venezuelan Decree outrages the established tenets of international law and practice it is to be found in the terms of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone which, as I have said, Venezuela has both signed and ratified. Under Article 24 (1) of the Convention, Guyana has specified rights relating to police, customs, sanitation and other matters in the contiguous zone, that is, the belt of sea within 12 miles from the coast, and the existence of these rights excludes the competence of Venezuela or any other State to extend her sovereignty or jurisdiction over any part of that belt of waters.

The Venezuelan Decree is an unmistakable attempt to assert a claim to the Essequibo region of Guyana outside of the Mixed Commission and is, therefore, yet another calculated breach of Article V (2) of the Geneva Agreement which expressly provides that no claim whatsoever shall "be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed Commission while that Commission is in being".

It is serious enough on this account as one of a number of similar breaches; but what gives cause for particular concern about Venezuela's maturity and sense of responsibility as a member of international society is her threat, for such it is, to use armed force in support of the purported decree, since it must be obvious that any interference with Guyana's shipping, fishing or other rights would be an act of aggression violating the Charter of the United Nations and disturbing the peace of the Hemisphere. The conclusion is inescapable that Venezuela is prepared to renounce or ignore any international agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, and to defy the Charter of the United Nations at any time that it suits her whims or seems to promote some particular interest that she may for the moment be pursuing.

In the present circumstances I have asked our Ambassador in Caracas to return to Georgetown for immediate consultations. Yesterday, at the request of our Permanent Representation in New York, the United Nations Secretary General circulated to all Member States of the United Nations a report of the Venezuelan decree together with the statement I issued on learning of it. In like manner I am arranging for this present statement to be communicated to Member States as well as to be specifically circulated to Commonwealth Governments through the Commonwealth Secretary General in London.

I have conveyed directly this morning to the British High Commissioner in Georgetown, whose Government is a party to the controversy with Venezuela and a signatory to the Geneva Agreement, the serious views which my Government takes of this recent development and the responsibilities which in our view devolve on the British Government as a result. I have also held discussions with the accredited representatives of other friendly Governments in Georgetown who are members of the United Nations, namely, Canada, the Republic of India, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America, informing them of the development and inviting their support for Guyana in the face of the Venezuelan acts of aggression. We are taking every step available to us to protect our interests and secure our territorial integrity. I also held lengthy discussions this morning with the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Leader's unavoidable absence from Georgetown. This is a matter which transcends domestic political differences.

I cannot tell with any certainty where this ill advised course of action on which the Government of Venezuela has embarked will lead us. We must be prepared, however, for even more aggressive demonstrations of international lawlessness from the Government of Venezuela. We will need all our courage and strength to withstand these efforts to break our will and despoil our land. Venezuela has now made clear her intention to seek relentlessly to re-impose the yoke of colonialism on a young and small nation that has only recently succeeded in freeing itself from the tutelage of another imperial power. We have no quarrel with the Venezuelan people but we will not lack courage or resolve in resisting aggressive demands of a Venezuelan Government that is prepared to defile the traditions of Bolivar and to flout precepts of Hemispheric and world order and security.

In our stand for survival we shall call upon the conscience of all peace loving people to speak out in our cause and we shall need all our unity as a people so that our voice may be heard in all corners of the world and in all the Councils of the world's institutions for peace.

By agreement with the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, I propose . . . during next week to offer this House an opportunity to discuss and debate fully the subject of Venezuela's latest move of aggression against Guyana.

G. AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO THE DECREE

The United States government was concerned over this new situation and expressed it opposition to this decree. On Saturday 13 July, the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, called in Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera Paris to discuss the developments. He told the Ambassador that the meaning of the decree was unclear to the American government and would appreciate an explanation since it was potentially serious both from the point of view of international law and also of internal Guyanese politics. He said that if the intent of the decree was merely to put the world on notice that "when and if Venezuela attained sovereignty over territory it claimed", the United States would have no problem with it although it was difficult to see what advantage there was to Venezuela in issuing this decree at that time. However, he added that the US did not accept decree's validity if it implied actual exercise of sovereignty and, if the matter came up in any international forum, the US could not support Venezuela.

The United States also viewed the decree as serious in terms of the Guyanese electoral situation. The American government felt that it was of more immediate interest to Venezuela and hemisphere if Forbes Burnham - whom the Americans were supporting - would win the forthcoming elections in December 1968 in order to prevent Cheddi Jagan from re-gaining power. Katzenbach believed that moves such as this claim made by the Venezuelan decree were not helpful because they eroded Burnham electoral strength and diverted his attention during the critical remaining six month campaign period. Accordingly, it also made it difficult for the American government to counsel Burnham to use moderation whenever he felt obligated to defend his position.

The details of this meeting were set out in the following telegram sent by the Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the US Embassy in Caracas. Copies were also sent to the American Embassies in Georgetown and London. (The telegram was published in 2003 by the US State Department in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico).

544. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela

Caracas, July 13, 1968, 2159Z.

202053. Following is uncleared memcon:

Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera Paris to discuss July 9 Venezuelan decree asserting sovereignty over territorial seas from 3 to 12 miles off of part of Guyana claimed by Venezuela. In cordial but serious discussion, Under Secretary made following points:

(1) Meaning of decree was unclear to us and we would appreciate explanation, as it was potentially serious both from point of view international law and point of view internal Guyanese politics.

(2) If intent decree were merely to put world on notice that when and if Venezuela attained sovereignty over territory it claimed, Venezuelan law with respect territorial waters would obtain, we would have no problem with it although it was difficult to see what advantage there was to Venezuela in issuing it at this time.

(3) If, however, as accompanying explanatory note seemed to suggest, Venezuela intended immediately to exercise rights of sovereignty in 3-12 mile zone we would take "most serious" view of situation. As international lawyer, he himself could not see how such claim could be asserted and doubted that Ambassador Tejera would, in his capacity as lawyer, defend it. International law was clear that maritime rights and rights to continental shelf (which Guyana always claimed) attached to coastal state and at present Guyana was clearly the coastal state. The U.S., therefore, did not accept decree's validity if it implied actual exercise of sovereignty and, if matter came up in international forum, we could not support Venezuela. While we would not make public statement unless we had to, we would have to advise U.S. shipping and other private interests if they asked that we did not accept validity of decree.

(4) We also viewed decree as serious in terms Guyanese electoral situation. It was, we thought, of more immediate interest to Venezuela than to us and hemisphere that Burnham win elections which would probably take place in December and that Jagan be excluded. Moves such as this claim were not helpful as they eroded Burnham electoral strength in difficult elections and diverted his attention during critical remaining six month campaign period. It also made it difficult for us to counsel Burnham to use moderation as he felt obligated to defend his position.

(5) We viewed explanatory note, with allusions such as "physical act of possession", as more disturbing than decree itself and wondered what intent of Venezuela was in light of assurances President of Venezuela and country's highest officials had given that Venezuela would not resort to force. Under Secretary again emphasized seriousness of our concern if Venezuela intended exercise sovereignty.

Tejera replied that he knew nothing of decree and explanatory note, having only received their texts, but he would immediately report to Caracas and ask for instructions. Speaking personally, he at first attributed decree to Guyanese intransigence in Mixed Commission and especially their refusal to accept Venezuelan proposals for joint development. He recited history of Venezuela's frustrations in attempt to get Guyana to discuss settlement of issue in Mixed Commission and claimed Venezuela, which desired settlement by peaceful means had used great restraint in contrast to Burnham's inflammatory actions such as his recent speech in Birmingham, U.K. With regard to claim to territorial sea, he was certain that disputed territory would someday return to Venezuela and it was only natural and right Venezuela should have territorial waters which she would have under her Constitution and which are not claimed by party which wrongfully occupied disputed territory through inheritance from U.K. He would, however, query Caracas and let Under Secretary know as soon as he received reply.

For Caracas: You should convey above to President Leoni as soon as possible after clearance of memcon, hopefully early Monday.

For London: You should convey substance to ForOff.

For Georgetown: You may convey general line of conversation to Burnham in strictest confidence but should avoid giving him any encouragement to take matter to international organizations.

Rusk

--

In a response, the US Embassy in Caracas in a telegram to the State Department on 16 July reported that Venezuelan officials were "piqued over US position on decree as stated Saturday by Katzenbach." In a meeting on 16 July 1968 with the American ambassador in Caracas, Maurice Bernbaum, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Iribarren Borges, declared that Venezuela's "territorial claims must take precedence over any consideration their effect on Guyana's domestic political situation." The telegram also stated that on the same day Minister of Interior Leandro Mora told an Embassy officer that the State Department did not appreciate "Venezuela's 'feelings" on this matter."

H. RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The debate on the Venezuelan decree took place on Wednesday 17 July in the Guyana National Assembly and the leading members of the three political parties - PPP, PNC and UF - were unanimous in condemning Venezuela. However, Dr. Jagan was the only leader who urged that all matters relating to Venezuelan aggression should be raised in the Security Council of the United Nations. At the end of the debate the following motion condemning the Venezuelan aggression, including the occupation of Guyanese territory on Ankoko Island, was unanimously passed by the National Assembly:

WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of Venezuela by a Decree of Dr. Raul Leoni, President of the said Republic, being Decree No. 1552 published in the Official Gazette of Venezuela (No. 28,672) of 9th July, 1968, has purported to annex as part of the territorial waters and contiguous zone of Venezuela a belt of sea lying along the coast of Guyana between the mouth of the Essequibo River and Waini Point;

AND WHEREAS the said Decree purports to require the armed forces of Venezuela to impose the dominion of Venezuela over the said belt of sea:

AND WHEREAS the said belt of sea forms part of the territorial sea and contiguous zone of Guyana and is situate over the continental shelf forming part of the territory of Guyana;

AND WHEREAS the said Decree is repugnant to the territorial sovereignty and the established rights of Guyana and is in violation of international law and the accepted practice of nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement 1966 concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Venezuela;

AND WHEREAS in violation of the Geneva Agreement Venezuela continues to occupy territory of Guyana in Ankoko Island;

RESOLVED, That this Assembly -

(i) declare the said Decree to be a nullity and approve of it being so treated by the Government of Guyana insofar as it purports to relate to any part of the sea, including the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, adjacent to any part of the coast of Guyana and to any part of the continental shelf forming part of the territory of Guyana;

(ii) condemn the said Decree as constituting a threat of aggression against Guyana and a situation likely to endanger peace and security;

(iii) denounce as an act of aggression against Guyana done contrary to the Charter of the United Nations any attempt by the Government of Venezuela to implement the said Decree over any part of the sea, including the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, adjacent to any part of the coast of Guyana or any part of the continental shelf forming part of the territory of Guyana;

(iv) approve of the Government of Guyana taking all necessary steps to secure the territorial integrity of Guyana, including the rights under international law to and over the sea adjacent to its coast, including the territorial sea and contiguous zone, and the continental shelf forming part of the territory of Guyana.

I. THE GUYANA PROTEST

A copy of the resolution passed by the Guyana National Assembly was sent on the 19 July by the Guyana Government to the Venezuelan of Foreign Affairs Minister. On the day before through its Embassy in Caracas, the Guyana Government also sent to Venezuela a Note of Protest strongly condemning the Decree as a form of aggression against Guyana. The Note stated, in part:

...The Government of Guyana has noted that Venezuela has ratified, without any reservations that are material in the present context, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, the Convention on the High Seas, 1958, and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 1958. The said Conventions recognise that sovereignty over the territorial sea and the continental shelf and jurisdiction over the contiguous zone belong to the coastal State and determine and regulate the rights, including fishing rights, that may be exercised in areas forming part of the high seas. Guyana is and has been at all material times the only State exercising sovereignty over the coastal territory lying between the mouth of the Essequibo River and Waini Point, and, accordingly, sovereignty over the territorial sea and the continental shelf and jurisdiction over the contiguous zone adjacent to the said region of Guyana can and do belong only to the State of Guyana and cannot and do not belong to any other State.

Having regard to the relevant principles of international law and to the matters hereinbefore mentioned, the Government of Guyana wishes that it be conveyed to the Government of Venezuela as follows:

(i) that the Government of Guyana considers the said decree to be repugnant to the territorial sovereignty and the established rights of Guyana, to be in violation of international law and the accepted practice of nations, and to be contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea;

(ii) that the Government of Guyana considers the said Decree to be a nullity and will ignore it insofar as it purports to relate to any part of the sea, including the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, adjacent to any part of the coast of Guyana and to any part of the continental shelf forming part of the territory of Guyana;

(iii) that the Government of Guyana considers the said Decree as constituting a threat of Aggression against Guyana and a situation likely to endanger international peace and security;

(iv) that the Government of Guyana will consider as an act of aggression contrary to the Charter of the United Nations any attempt by the Government of Venezuela to implement the said Decree over any part of the sea, including the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, adjacent to any part of the continental shelf forming part of the territory of Guyana. . .

At the same time this Protest Note was sent to the Venezuelan Government, Guyana's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, John Carter, issued a statement to the Latin American Group at the United Nations in which he described the Decree as an act of "international lawlessness". Four days later Carter, in a letter to the UN Secretary General, U Thant, asked that copies of the Geneva Agreement, Burnham's statement to the Guyana National Assembly on the 12 July, and the resolution of the Guyana National Assembly condemning the Decree (all of which had been sent to the Secretary General) should be circulated to all Member States of the United Nations.

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During the debate on the issue of the Venezuelan Decree of the Sea in the Guyana National Assembly on the 17 July 1968 (Chapter 22), both the PPP and the ruling PNC-UF coalition stated their positions on the border issue in very clear terms. Their leaders were unanimous in denouncing the Venezuelan claim, but the PPP and the PNC-UF coalition expressed differences on how the matter should have been (and should in the future be) handled. For the PPP, the main speakers were Dr. Cheddi Jagan, the Leader of the Opposition, and Ashton Chase, Deputy Leader of the PPP.

Fourthly, I suggest that we should keep this matter as a matter above party politics. If there is to be an election campaign later this year, or early next year, then the parties must be agreed that we must not use this situation for secular or party advantage. . .

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The People's National Congress (PNC), led by Forbes Burnham, took office as the senior partner in the coalition Government with the United Force (UF), led by Peter D'Aguiar, in December 1964. The coalition did not last for the entire four-year period prior to the next general elections, but it existed at the time when the Venezuelan Decree of the Sea was proclaimed in July 1968. However, even before the proclamation of the Decree, the UF, a strong pro-American and anti-communist party, had lost political influence in the coalition since a number of its Parliamentarians and a few from the PPP had defected to join the PNC, thus giving that party a voting majority in the National Assembly. For the general elections which were subsequently held in December 1968, the PNC majority instituted a number of changes in the electoral system and was able to collect a majority in the National Assembly in the light of local and international accusations that the elections were fraudulent conducted.

The PNC itself did not take the strong anti-imperialist position on the border issue as did the PPP. From time to time, the PNC-UF Government made statements through the Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham and the Attorney General and Minister of State, Shridath Ramphal, and occasionally by other Ministers. Leading policy statements by the Government were again made in the National Assembly by Burnham and Ramphal during the debate on the motion condemning the Venezuelan Decree of the Sea on the 17 July 1968.

The behaviour of the Venezuelans in claiming the zone outside our territorial sea while we own the continental shelf beneath resembles that of a comedian in its irrationality and absurdity. Therefore, this resolution whereby the Government of Guyana regards the Decree as a nullity, must stand.

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CHAPTER 26

THE RUPUNUNI REVOLT

Just two weeks before the Guyanese general elections in December 1968, elections had also taken place in Venezuela. President Leoni had been defeated along with his party, Acción Democrática, in the Presidential and Congressional elections. The elections had been won by the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and the new President, Rafael Caldera, and his cabinet were due to be sworn in to office in late January 1969. However, before this inauguration date, matters of critical importance involving the Venezuelan authorities were developing in the Rupununi District on the south-west border of Guyana.

A. THE UPRISING IN RUPUNUNI

At the beginning of January 1969, just three weeks after the December 1968 rigged elections in Guyana, a group of large ranch owners in the Rupununi region, supported by a number of Amerindians, broke out in open rebellion against the Guyana Government in the savannah area near the border with Brazil. The Amerindians involved in the uprising were mainly employees of the rebel ranchers who were Guyanese of European ancestry.

In determining the causes of this insurrection, various factors were evident. These included frustrations over the recent rigged elections which returned the PNC to power, and opposition to the proposed demarcation of Amerindian lands as set out by the Amerindian Lands Commission. The lands issue clearly had a role in influencing some Amerindians to support the rebel ranchers.

Whatever role these factors played cannot be fully determined, but it was clear that the rebels expressed their non-allegiance to the state and sought the assistance of a foreign government to promote the secession of part of the territory of Guyana.

In the course of this revolt, the ranchers declared that the Rupununi District had seceded from Guyana and that they would set up a Government of the "Republic of the Rupununi". Valerie Hart, a 27-year-old UF candidate in the December 1968 elections in Guyana, and the wife of one of the rebel ranchers, shortly after declared herself as President of the "Republic". However, she and the ring leaders, on 2 January, fled to Venezuela and Brazil after the rebellion was crushed by the Guyana Defence Force (GDF).

Apparently, the Guyana government, through its investigations, was able to prove that Venezuela helped to organise, equip and support the revolt. The rebel ranchers from the North Rupununi savannahs were transported in late December 1968 by Venezuelan aircraft to Venezuela where they were trained by the Venezuelan army and supplied with weapons. Shortly after their return to Guyana on the 1 January 1969, they attacked the administrative town of Lethem and its outlying Amerindian villages, killing five policemen and two civilians and destroying a number of Government buildings. However, the revolt was quickly crushed by the Guyana Defence Force, but most of the rebels who managed to escape, were given refuge by the Venezuelan Government who resettled them in two villages, San Martin de Turumbo and Yuruani, close to the Guyana border.

A group of about thirty men, mostly Amerindians, were arrested by the Guyana security forces, but some were released a few weeks later after their detention in Georgetown. However, ten of them were later charged with the murder of the five policemen and the two civilians. Those charged were: Ignatius Charlie, 23; Anaclito Alicio, 20; Handel Singh, 28; Francis James, 20; Charles Davis, 20; Damian Phillips, 21; Brenton Singh, 43, Colin Melville, 22; Aldwyn Singh, 41; and Patrick Melville, 17.

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the newspapers and radio stations on 3 January 1969 reported that there was an armed uprising of Amerindians seeking to secede the Rupununi district from Guyana and place it under annexation with Brazil or Venezuela. Interestingly, the Guyanese ambassador in Caracas, Eustace R. Braithwaite, (the author of To Sir With Love), later that day informed the international media, based in instructions he received from the Minister of State Sridath Ramphal, that there was "absolutely no truth" of an armed rebellion among the Amerindians but that "some trouble" had arisen among a few ranchers in the Rupununi and that the Government found it necessary to send security forces to the area to restore order.

B. STATEMENT BY BURNHAM TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

However, on the afternoon of the same day, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham admitted that there was indeed an armed rebellion when he made the following statement in the National Assembly:

There have been considerable disorders in the Rupununi over the past two days and from information available to the government, these disorders have been instigated and propelled by certain sections of the ranchers, some of whom hold foreign citizenship, who have not scrupled those under duress the services of some of the native Amerindian inhabitants.

One of the persons principally involved in the disorders has since surrendered to the security forces, cum machine gun. There has been loss of life though it is not possible at this moment to give an authentic and accurate figure.

Detachments of the Guyana Defence Force and Police, well armed and supplied, have been deployed in the area which centres around Lethem and the northern savannahs. As soon as further and more definite information is available, I propose to communicate to the nation as much as security considerations permit.

In the meantime, I have been keeping in close touch with the Honourable Mr. Ram Karran who has been deputed by the Leader of the Opposition to act and speak on his behalf during the latter's absence from the country.

The evidence so far suggests that the disorders were not spontaneous but masterminded and planned by hostile elements in and outside Guyana.

C. BROADCAST BY BURNHAM

Then in a nation-wide radio broadcast on the 4 January 1969, Burnham narrated his government's version of the events that occurred in the Rupununi:

The picture of the recent disorders in the northern Rupununi savannahs has now become sufficiently clear for me to place before the public the facts of these tragic and sinister events as they have so far unfolded.

On Thursday, 2nd January, 1969, at about eleven o'clock in the morning, the township of Lethem-which is the principal centre of Government administration in the Rupununi District- came under heavy gun fire attack.

The main target of the attack was the police station which was manned by twelve members of the Guyana Police Force and a number of civilian employees and which had radio communication with Police Headquarters in Georgetown.

It is now known that the attack was made by a band of heavily armed ranchers of the Rupununi District, drawn mainly, but not exclusively, from the Hart and Melville families.

The Hart ranch is at Pirara, 15 miles from Lethem- and the control centre of the operation. It was from Pirara that the terrorists had set out earlier in the morning for Lethem.

On arriving at Lethem they opened fire on the police station with a missile throwing bazooka and with bursts from automatic weapons. Policemen rushing out of the building were fired at, and at least one was killed in this way. The attackers then entered the station and, in the struggle that ensued, shot and killed three other policemen and one civilian employee, Victor Hernandez, an Amerindian, who was at that time a member of the Board of Governors of the School of Agriculture. The senior police officer at Lethem who was at the District Commissioner's Office at the time of the attack was shot and killed there.

Nor were the security forces the only object of the attack. The Government dispenser, who came down to the police station when the firing began, was shot at and wounded as he sought to take cover by his car.

The terrorists then rounded up the residents-including the District Commissioner, Mr. Motilall Persaud, and his wife-and held them prisoners and hostages in the abattoir. Other persons were locked into their homes. At least ten thousand dollars of Government funds were taken.

One of the early acts of the terrorists immediately after their attack on the police station was to block the airstrip at Lethem with seven ton trucks and other obstructions, thus completely isolating Lethem except by a ground approach from some other point in the area. To make this isolation more effective, the terrorists simultaneously with the move in Lethem blocked the other airstrips in the area at Good Hope, Karasabai, Koranambo and Annai.

This left only the grass strip at Manari, five miles from Lethem, and it seems that the intention of the terrorists was to use this strip themselves with light aircraft. In fact, certain missionary priests who were at Lethem when the attack occurred were allowed to leave by road for Manari later on Thursday.

Contrary, however, to the expectation of the terrorists, news of the attack at Lethem had reached Georgetown by lunch time on Thursday and the same afternoon a number of policemen and the GDF personnel were flown into Manari by two Guyana Airways aircraft. Both planes were fired at from the approaches to the Manari strip, but neither was hit.

Within the next eighteen hours, a fully equipped and supplied contingent of the security forces was assembled at Manari and yesterday morning (Friday) they began to move on to Lethem. With the security forces advancing, the terrorists fled Lethem, probably for Pirara. On arrival at Lethem, therefore, armed forces were able to re assert lawful authority without any resistance.

Their arrival confirmed the casualties earlier reported, and the wounded persons were immediately flown to Georgetown. The District Commissioner is now engaged in assessing the damage, both of a public and private nature, and the security forces have been assisting in the return to normalcy.

Meanwhile the terrorist groups that had closed down the airstrips at Good Hope and Annai on the morning of January 2, had also overrun the small police contingents there and closed radio communication between these outposts and Police Headquarters in Georgetown. So far, as we know, there was no loss of life at either Good Hope or Annai, but at both places, the policemen were tied up, placed in trucks and driven off towards Lethem.

By then, of course, Lethem was under the control of the security forces and, on discovering this, on their return journey, the terrorists dumped the bound policemen and fled.

Today, the security forces have continued their operations to restore all points in the area to normal governmental control and to pursue and capture these criminal elements that are already responsible for the loss of nine lives. The police posts at Annai and Good Hope have been relieved and the centres of terrorist activity at Pirara, Good Hope and Sunnyside have been razed to ground by our forces.

A number of persons have been arrested in the area, and this afternoon word was received from the police authorities at Boa Vista (Brazil) that seven of the terrorists have been taken into custody there in the flight from Guyana. Steps are being taken to bring these fugitives to face trial under the criminal law of the land they have defiled and betrayed.

On the basis of what I have already said, the acts of insurrection and murder that I have narrated are of the most serious nature; but they are, in fact, even more serious and sinister than would appear on the surface. One of the terrorists [Colin Melville] who surrendered to the security forces yesterday has given an account of the entire operation-an account which places it in a different category from that of mere criminal terrorism. From this account it is now known that there was a gathering of Rupununi ranchers on the 23rd December [1968] at the home of Harry Hart at Moreru in the northern savannahs. At this meeting a plan was unfolded for capturing the main Government outposts in the Rupununi with assistance from the Venezuelan authorities and declaring the establishment of a separatist state in cessation from the rest of Guyana.

On the 24th December, a group of ranchers and ranch hands numbering approximately forty were flown from the Hart ranch at Pirara to Santa Theresa in Venezuela where the party spent the night. On Christmas Day, 25th December, the group were driven to an airstrip at Santa Helena and airlifted in a Venezuelan military aircraft to a Venezuelan army training camp at a point approximately two hours flying time away. They spent seven days receiving intensive training in the use of weapons with which they were supplied, including automatic weapons and bazookas. On New Year's Day, 1st January, 1969, the group were flown back to Santa Helena, again by Venezuelan military aircraft. The following morning, at dawn, they were flown to the Hart ranch at Pirara, and set out immediately for Lethem and the acts of terrorism and murder I have already related.

The insurrection as we know was planned, organised and carried out by ranchers of the Rupununi-the savannah aristocrats. Such Amerindian citizens as were involved were employed in a secondary capacity and appeared generally to have acted under duress and in response to the orders of their rancher employers. Nevertheless, within a few hours of the attack on Lethem, the Venezuelan press and radio were reporting an Amerindian uprising in the Rupununi and suggested that it arose out of the wish of these Guyanese citizens to come under the sovereignty of Venezuela.

In addition, Valerie Hart, the wife of one of the Hart brothers, and a candidate of the United Force at the recent election, was taken to Venezuela by the aircraft that brought the armed gang. In Venezuela, Valerie Hart has been provided with facilities for broadcasting appeals for assistance in support of what she describes as an uprising of the indigenous population. These appeals are beamed to the United States but call for assistance from all possible sources.

The pattern of this Venezuelan involvement is easy to discern. Going back to the Talyhardat incident, the Venezuelan authorities have sought to manipulate the Guyanese Amerindian community to promote the spurious claim to the Essequibo region of Guyana. This was followed more recently by the abortive attempt to establish and finance a Guyanese Amerindian Party and in a variety of ways to promote an Amerindian movement favourable to Venezuela's territorial ambitions.

At the twenty third session of the General Assembly in New York last October, Guyana warned of a massive effort being made by Venezuela "to subvert the loyalty of Guyana's indigenous Amerindian people". We pointed out that it was an effort that had no lack of financial resources and which functions through hand picked agents, working under the direction of the Venezuelan authorities from bases situated on the Venezuelan side of the border.

Into the campaign of subversion the Venezuelan authorities have now recruited this group of Rupununi ranchers who have traditionally resented the authority of the central Government, more especially since independence when the authority passed from British to Guyanese hands. The results of the recent general elections which have confirmed the process of decolonisation, was apparently the signal for insurrection among these people who have induced in themselves a conviction that the grasslands of the Rupununi are theirs and theirs alone to the exclusion of others, including the Amerindian people, and especially to the exclusion of the Government of Guyana. Not surprisingly, they have found common cause with the Government of Venezuela who have once more-and again with a traditional clumsiness and indifference to Guyanese opinion-embarked on overt interference in Guyana's internal affairs with the objective of advancing their traditional claims.

It is perhaps not without significance that at the same moment that Venezuelan representatives were sitting down with their Guyanese counterparts at a meeting of the Mixed Commission in Caracas between Christmas and New Year, Venezuelan army personnel were training and equipping saboteurs and terrorists and launching them in a campaign of insurrection in Guyana. Nor is it perhaps without significance that they chosed for the scene for their campaign a part of Guyana which has a frontier, not with Venezuela, but with the friendly State of Brazil.

I do not know where these events will lead us or what their excesses of armed interference Venezuela may be poised to embark upon. This may well be the beginning of a series of similar incursions launched by the Venezuelan government, and we must, therefore, expect further acts of aggression and intimidation from the new imperialism on our western doorstep. We must be ready as a nation to meet all eventualities and we must prepare ourselves for further attacks upon our national integrity from the combined forces of Venezuelan military authorities and disloyal and subversive elements in Guyana. . .

Burnham departed for London on the following day (5 December) to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference. He felt the situation in the Rupununi which was returning to "normalcy" should not impede his attendance at this "specially important conference".

D. ACTIVITIES IN CARACAS

During this period, a flurry of activities was taking place in Venezuela. On Saturday 4 January 1969, the Guyana Embassy in Caracas sent the following telegram to the Guyana Ministry of External Affairs:

Valerie Hart, (27), claiming to be a Member of Parliament elected on a UF ticket, arrived in Ciudad Bolivar on a plane owned by the Rupununi Producers' Association. From there she travelled by a private plane to Caracas for meetings with Iribarren Borges and Interior Minister Moro. Her intention was to solicit support for the armed resistance by ranchers and others in the Rupununi against the government. Hart claimed that the movement was headed by a person named Melville and had widespread support for the secession of the Rupununi to Venezuela. Hart stayed at the Hotel Conde near to the Foreign Ministry.

By Sunday 5 January, Ambassador Braithwaite received copies by cable of Burnham's statement to the National Assembly and his radio address on the situation in the Rupununi. That afternoon he was visited by Mr. Herron and Mr. Walters, two political advisers attached to the American Embassy in Caracas, to discuss the situation. The American diplomats showed him transcripts of messages sent by the American ambassador in Georgetown giving details of the Rupununi situation, including a statement to the Guyana police by Colin Melville on his participation in the events and of circumstances prior and during the events as were known to him.

E. BRAITHWAITE'S MEETING WITH IRIBARREN BORGES

On Monday 6 January, which was a public holiday in Venezuela, Braithwaite sought a joint audience with the Venezuelan Foreign Minister Iribarren Borges and the Interior Minister Dr. Leandro Mora. Subsequently a joint meeting was arranged for 11.00 a.m. at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But on his arrival at the Ministry, he learned that Mora could not be located and Borges apologised for the Interior Minister's absence.

Braithwaite told Borges that his visit was routine and he was anxious to seek clarification from the Venezuelan Government regarding the situation in the Rupununi. Immediately Borges said that Venezuela was not involved and categorically denied any participation or identification with the uprising.

Braithwaite informed Borges that the Guyana Government had indisputable evidence volunteered by some of the major participants in the uprising that Venezuelan aircraft, personnel and weapons had been involved, and that planning for the operation and training in the use of weapons were carried out on Venezuelan territory.

However, Borges vehemently denied this.

Braithwaite pointed out that there was no direct air communication between Guyana and Venezuela, but nevertheless Mrs. Valerie Hart, a confessed leader of the rebellion, was able to fly from the Rupununi to Ciudad Bolivar and then to Caracas. Borges said that as far as he knew, Mrs. Hart had flown in a private plane from Rupununi to Venezuela, but she was not in any way assisted by the Venezuelan government.

Braithwaite reminded Borges that even though Mrs. Hart had entered Venezuela illegally, she was able, immediately on arrival in Caracas, to have meetings with him (Borges) and the Interior Minister. To this Borges replied that the woman had asked to see him, and as Foreign Minister he had no choice but to agree to meet her. In response, Braithwaite said that since the woman arrived in Caracas, she was in the care of the Venezuelan Government which was assisting her in arranging press conferences and radio and television interviews and in making appeals for arms and other support for the rebels. Borges replied that that the Government undertook to look after her purely on humanitarian grounds and again stated that his Government was in no way implicated in the uprising.

The Guyanese ambassador told Borges that on the one hand there were his repeated denials and on the other an accumulation of incontrovertible facts which placed his denials in very poor light. At this, Borges became quite agitated and ended the meeting after again insisting that he could do no more that assert his government's non-involvement in the uprising.

Later that afternoon, Borges at a press conference again denied Venezuela's complicity in the abortive rebellion, but stated that more than one hundred persons from the Rupununi were "given refuge" in Venezuela. He avoided mentioning if these persons were granted political asylum.

On the following day (7 January), according to a Reuter report, Braithwaite said that Guyana was absolutely certain Venezuela was involved in the uprising. He said his meeting with Broges "had no particular positive factor in favour of Guyana, but it left the impression that Borges was taken aback on learning of the rebels' confession." The ambassador admitted the Venezuelan Government might not have supported the uprising directly but felt sure that officials in Caracas were aware of military training to the Rupununi rebels and military airlifts to and through the Rupununi region.

F. STATEMENT BY BRAZIL

Meanwhile, the Brazilian Government expressed its concern over the situation and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following communiqué on 7 January 1969:

The Brazilian Government is following since its first moments and with the utmost interest the recent occurrence in the Rupununi region, in areas close to the Guyanese and Roraima Territory borders, and immediately has taken measures in order to intensify the control of the border, and prevent any violation of Brazilian territory. The Brazilian government, in accordance with its principles of non-intervention in domestic affairs of other countries, has expressed to the Guyanese Government in this difficult moment its belief that this bordering and friendly nation will completely overcome the movement that disturbs its internal security and menaces its territorial integrity.

G. VALERIE HART'S ACTIVITIES IN CARACAS

In Caracas, Valerie Hart continued to press the Venezuelan Government for military assistance and intervention in the Rupununi. But on 7 January, the Foreign Ministry turned down another of her appeals for Venezuela to invade Rupununi and take over the region. A Reuter report (of 8 January) of her meeting at the Foreign Ministry stated that the Venezuelan Government bluntly refused the request for any military intervention to aid the separatist movement which staged the uprising.

Speaking to the press shortly after her meeting at the Foreign Ministry, Hart insisted, "Venezuela must assert her rightful claim and not only the Rupununi but all the 50,000 square miles of territory of the disputed Essequibo region."

But Foreign Minister Ignacio Iribarren Borges crushed the rebel leader's slim final hopes with a flat and negative answer.

"We would never intervene directly in what is essentially a Guyanese problem," he affirmed.

Nevertheless, Hart continued in Caracas to urge the Venezuelan Government for open support. She held several press conferences and gave television interviews, and it was clear that she received assistance from official circles since interpreters were provided for her on account of her inability to speak Spanish. At one of her press conferences on 8 January-the day after the Venezuelan Foreign Minister refused her request for military intervention-she declared (according to a Reuter report): "If Venezuela does not intervene right now with troops they would have in their hands a situation similar to the Bay of Pigs." She, no doubt, was referring to the Cuban situation in which opponents of the Castro regime had been promised support when the initial attempt at invasion proved abortive.

This statement openly insinuated that the Rupununi rebels had received some kind of support and possibly military training and arms as alleged by Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham.

H. NOTE OF PROTEST

In Georgetown on 8 January, the Charge d'Affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy, Luis Martinez , was summoned to the Ministry of External Affairs and was handed the following Note of Protest:

The Ministry of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Venezuela and has the honour to request that the Embassy bring to the closer attention of the Government of the Republic of Venezuela certain incidents of a nature deeply disturbing to the Government of Guyana which have recently occurred in the Rupununi District of Guyana.

On January 2, 1969, a body of men armed with bazookas and automatic weapons attacked the administrative centres of the town of Lethem in the Rupununi and carried their attack to several outlying villages. These incidents were swiftly dealt with by Guyana's Security Forces, and those apprehended have shed further light upon the iniquitous involvement of authorities of the Republic of Venezuela in the internal affairs of Guyana.

The Government of Guyana is aware that a meeting of ranchers, some of them citizens of Guyana and other residents of the country, took place on December 23, 1968, at Moreru, in the Northern Rupununi Savannahs, at which plans were outlined for the seizure of the main administrative centres in the Rupununi, and, with the assistance of the Venezuelan authorities, for the establishment of a separate state in secession from the rest of Guyana.

The Government of Guyana is aware that on December 24, 1968, these men travelled by aircraft to Santa Elena, Venezuela, and on December 25, were conveyed to Santa Teresa, Venezuela, from where they were flown by Venezuelan army aircraft to a Venezuelan army training camp some two hours flying time from the point of departure.

The Government of Guyana is aware that for the next seven days, and under the supervision of Venezuela authorities, these men were trained in the use of the weapons with which they were ultimately supplied by those authorities, and which included automatic weapons and bazookas.

The Government of Guyana is aware that on January 1, 1969, these men were returned to Santa Teresa by Venezuelan army aircraft and thence on January 2, 1969 were flown to Pirara, Guyana, in a Dakota aircraft owned and operated by Venezuelan personnel. From Pirara, these men, having been trained and armed by authorities of the Republic of Venezuela, set out to attack the town of Lethem and its outlying villages. Buildings were destroyed by bazooka shells and police officers and men at Lethem were murdered with automatic weapons.

The Government of Guyana is aware that a Guyanese citizen named Valerie Hart left Guyana illegally on the Dakota aircraft which brought these men to Pirara on January 2, 1969, and is now in Caracas, Venezuela, where she has been provided with facilities for broadcasting appeals for assistance in support of what she described as an "uprising" of the indigenous population.

The Government of Venezuela, by the responsibility it bears for the training, arming and supplying of a group of wealthy, reactionary landholders, men who have resented the authority of the Central Government since the independence of Guyana was declared in 1966, stands indicted not only of the breach of every relevant principle of international law but of a consummate hypocrisy in the role it purports to play as part of the developing world which is a world of nations striving to better the lot, not of privileged groups, but of the great majority of their peoples.

The Government of Guyana denounces the Government of Venezuela for the invidious, divisive and self-serving support it has given to a wealthy, reactionary minority which sought to enrich itself by seizing lands which are the heritage of all Guyanese.

The Government of Guyana considers it worthy of note that the Mixed Commission of Guyanese and Venezuelan representatives, established under the Geneva Agreement of 1966, was meeting in Caracas, in good faith on the part of Guyana, during the very period in which Venezuelan armed personnel were training and equipping saboteurs and launching them on a campaign of terror inside Guyana. This most recent, and most iniquitous, of the long list of violations of the Geneva Agreement by the Government of Venezuela calls into question more gravely than ever before the professed desire of the Government of Venezuela to maintain peaceful relations with Guyana as a neighbouring state in Latin America, as one of the newly independent states in the Western Hemisphere and as one of the small developing countries of the world.

The Government of Guyana condemns in the strongest terms the hypocrisy of the Government of Venezuela which having stirred the Hemisphere with its protests at the interference of other Governments in its internal political life, and, which having invoked the great Latin American jurisprudential traditions of non-intervention, is and continues to be, deeply involved in activities which constitute the grossest interference in the internal political life of Guyana.

The Government of Guyana protests in the strongest terms this most recent act of intervention on the part of the Government of Venezuela in the internal affairs of Guyana. It represents the gravest act of interference in the internal political life of Guyana and is part of a pattern of such acts, one of which, as it will be recalled, led to the expulsion from Guyana as long ago as 1966, of a Second Secretary of the Venezuelan Embassy in Georgetown, who was responsible for organising and financing clandestine meetings of the indigenous tribes of Guyana in a futile effort to induce them to express support for the spurious Venezuelan territorial claims.

The Government of Guyana is constrained to express its disgust at this most recent attempt by the Government of Venezuela to advance its spurious territorial claims under cover of subversion and terrorism.

The Government of Guyana gives notice to the Government of Venezuela that it will avail itself of every opportunity to ensure that the recent actions of the Government of Venezuela are brought to the attention of the International Community.

The Ministry of External Affairs takes this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of Venezuela the assurances of its highest consideration.

I. INCIDENT OVER THE NOTE OF PROTEST

That same afternoon in Caracas Ambassador Braithwaite received by cable from the Guyana Ministry of External Affairs the Guyana Note of Protest to be delivered to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. Just after 4.00 p.m., he went to the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry and handed the Note to Iribarren Borges who invited him to sit down and read it "aloud". At the end of the reading he informed the ambassador that he would contact him in a few days' time. But when Braithwaite returned to the Embassy half an hour later, he was informed by his staff that the Minister had called to invite him for a meeting at noon on the following day (9 January).

Braithwaite arrived promptly for the meeting and Minister handed him the Guyana Note of Protest explaining that his Government found the language "undiplomatic" and therefore it was unacceptable. Braithwaite departed and immediately after Borges told a gathering of media personnel that he had returned Guyana's Note both in Caracas and Georgetown because of its "undiplomatic language".

At the same time in Georgetown, the Charge d'Affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Guyana, (Martinez), met with Dr. Ptolemy Reid, the acting Prime Minister, for the purpose of returning the Note of Protest. Dr. Reid explained that so far as the Guyana Government was concerned the Note, having been received the day before by Martinez, was now the property of the Venezuelan government. Martinez then departed with the Note, but later he turned up at the Ministry of External Affairs where he sought to meet with the Permanent Secretary or the Chief of Protocol. However, his requests were denied and he subsequently departed.

J. MORA'S STATEMENT

Venezuela's activism moved to a new stage on 8 January when Interior Minister Reinaldo Leandro Mora announced the granting of Venezuelan documentation to refugees of the Rupununi region who fled Guyana following the abortive uprising. He said Venezuela considered the refugees as fellow citizens since they inhabited part of the territory being claimed by his country. He further claimed that as a member of the United Nations, Venezuela had a right to do so, and added that the "refugees" had come from "a zone that is considered Venezuelan and are being persecuted."

He explained that the refugees who sought political asylum in Venezuela "in the past two days" would be given jobs or land according to their profession. At Santa Elena, a border village near to the Brazilian and Guyanese frontiers, over one hundred refugees were granted asylum.

On making the announcement, the minister said Venezuela was offering help and documentation "in this painful moment in which the inhabitants of the Rupununi region are suffering." He reiterated Venezuela's conviction that the Guyanese Government carried out a bloody reprisal against Rupununi's inhabitants for taking up arms against the government.

Mora claimed this move to grant asylum did not mean that Venezuela was interfering in Guyana's internal affairs, and denied any implication in the uprising, saying that if it did, his country would have been controlling the region.. However, he admitted that Guyanese youths had received military training in Venezuela at the wish of their parents, but he did not specify the number and did not say whether they participated in the uprising.

K. STATEMENT BY REID

In Georgetown, the Acting Prime Minister, Dr. Ptolemy Reid, responding to Mora's statement and other statements reported in the media by Venezuelan Government officials on Venezuela's involvement in the insurrection, said that Venezuela had now further admitted that Guyanese youths had received military training in Venezuela. He added that the youths had left Guyana illegally without proper travel documents while Venezuela had allowed improper entry. This action provided irrefutable evidence of Venezuela's inspiration and support of the uprising. He refuted reports in the Venezuelan print media that Amerindians were being massacred, saying that those who died were all victims of the conspirators and denounced the attempted comparison (by the Venezuelan media) of the Rupununi situation with Biafra.

On the statement by Mora that Venezuela considered the refugees as Venezuelans since they inhabited part of the territory claimed by Venezuela, Reid said Venezuela "stands indicted of the breach of every relevant principle of international law" and the statement by the Interior Minister was consistent with Venezuela's behaviour in the past.

Here, note must be made of the fact that just six months before, during the debate in the Guyana National Assembly on the Venezuelan Decree of the Sea, the Third Deputy Prime Minister of the then PNC UF coalition Government, Randolph Cheeks, had stated that the Amerindians who were commuting between Venezuela and Guyana for decades ". . . do not recognise national boundaries or national borders", and that according to existing regulations, "Venezuelan Amerindians can come here and enjoy the same benefits as the Guyanese Amerindians and vice versa". Therefore, if the youths, as mentioned in Reid's statement were Amerindians, then according to Cheeks, those particular youths had not left the country illegally.

Thus, there was some contradiction in the statements of two different high ranking members of the Government of Guyana, albeit at different periods separated by a mere six months.

L. GUYANA'S LETTER TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL

On 9 January, Guyana's Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir John Carter, officially informed the Secretary General, U Thant, of the situation through the following letter:

Excellency,

I have the honour to bring the following to your most urgent attention.

On January 2, 1969, there took place in the Rupununi District in the south of Guyana a series of armed attacks on Government centres and peaceful farming villages which resulted in considerable loss of life and property.

The Government of Guyana is now in possession of irrefutable proof that the individuals who organised and carried out those crimes were trained for the purpose within the territory of the Republic of Venezuela, and supplied with arms by authorities of the Republic of Venezuela.

During the General Debate at the Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly my Minister of State for External Affairs drew attention to the massive effort which was being made by the Republic of Venezuela to subvert the loyalty of our people in order to advance its spurious territorial claims. He said, on October 3, 1968:

"It is an effort which has no lack of financial resources; which functions through hand-picked and trained agents working under the direction of the Venezuelan authorities from bases situated on the Venezuelan side of the border. . . A more flagrant premeditated course of interference in the internal political life of a neighbouring country directed from a governmental level it would be hard to find."

The extreme gravity of the consequences which may flow from this most recent calculated violation on the part of the Republic of Venezuela of generally accepted norms of international law and civilised behaviour compels my Government to request that you bring this matter, at your earliest possible convenience, to the attention of all States Members of the United Nations by way of a copy of this letter and of the attached Note which was issued from the Ministry of External Affairs in Georgetown to the Venezuelan Ambassador to Guyana.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. . .

M. LETTER FROM CLASC TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL

It was apparent that the rebels managed to garner some international support from the Confederacion Latino Americana Syndical Cristiana (CLASC) [Christian Democratic Trade Union] which had consultative status in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) which had its headquarters in Europe and branches in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Venezuela. In a letter to U Thant on 14 January, CLASC expressed support for the Rupununi rebels and urged the intervention of the United Nations. A copy was also sent to the UN Human Rights Commission. The letter, addressed from Caracas, and signed by its Secretary General, Emilio Maspero and Ernesto Molano of its "Organisation Division" stated:

As a result of the popular uprising in the Rupununi region of Guyana, the Government of that country led by Mr. Forbes Burnham has unleashed a bloody wave of retaliation against the entire Amerindian population.

The countryside has become a human hunting-ground for innocent peasants-villages and farms have been totally destroyed by incendiary bombs and those responsible have respected neither the civil population, women nor children. The Amerindians constitute the native population of Guyana and the great majority are peasants kept in misery and at the margin of survival, by successive Governments. Thousands of them are active members of the Guyana National Confederation at Workers and Peasants, a trade union movement affiliated to the Confederacion Latino Americana Sindica Cristiana (CLASC).

By means of this note we wish formally to denounce before the United Nations these acts which, by their unreasoning and repressive ferocity, threaten to transform Guyana into a second Biafra. Moreover, the incitement of this official violence is that of racial discrimination, the establishment at which is being attempted in the country, and which we wholeheartedly condemn and denounce.

In the name of all the workers of Guyana and in the name of the millions of workers of Latin America, CLASC demands intervention by the United Nations to restore peace in Guyana and to put an end to the official terrorism which the dictatorial Burnham Government has again launched against the Amerindian peasants of the Rupununi and other areas of the country. All workers must have equal opportunity and the fullest guarantees of their human at social rights. . .

A copy of this letter was handed by the UN Secretary General's office to the Guyana Permanent Mission at the UN for a response.

N. FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF VALERIE HART

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, Valerie Hart continued to be active in trying to win support for her cause. On 20 January, she visited the eastern city of Ciudad Bolivar to meet with the other rebel refugees who apparently were now working in the area. She told them not to give up the struggle and that they must continue to strive for the recovery of the Rupununi.

On her return to Caracas, she gave her version of the background of the uprising during a television interview. She said the Rupununi ranchers had on several occasions made representations to the Guyana Government because they were not satisfied with the conditions in the area. She claimed that the Amerindians were treated in a sub-human manner and that Government officers in the Rupununi frequently mistreated and assaulted the Amerindian women. She added that the only action taken as a result of their representations was the transfer of the defaulting officers. As a result, the ranchers became disillusioned and decided to form a movement with the backing of the Amerindians.

She further claimed that they had not planned to kill anyone but merely to seize certain Government buildings, hold the officers as hostages and close down the airstrips. After that action, they planned to negotiate with the Government to get concessions.

Unfortunately for the rebels, a priest who was not held as a hostage, used his radio set to contact someone in Georgetown and other persons opened one of the airstrips to allow the Government planes to land.

When asked by the interviewer about the policemen who were killed, she said that they were killed in the ranchers' self defence, and emphasised that the rebels had only rifles and guns which they normally used for hunting, but no sophisticated weapons. She admitted that it was a great blow to them that the revolt failed, but they were making plans for another attempt to take over the Rupununi, details of which she could not divulge. She added that it was not the end of the struggle, and she considered it as only the first battle lost.

O. VENEZUELAN POLITICAL LINKS WITH THE UPRISING

The failed uprising continued to hold the attention of the Venezuelan throughout January and February of 1969. In various commentaries in the Venezuelan newspapers, towards the end of January, there was speculation that the Rupununi uprising was one of a number of moves designed by the Acción Democratica (AD) [Democratic Action] party to prevent President-elect Caldera of Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI)[Social Christian Party] from assuming office. About a month prior to the December 1968 presidential election, one of the first of these moves was put into effect. A number of top army personnel known to be favourable to COPEI were dismissed. Then soon after the election, it was alleged that some AD ministers together with the governor of Bolivar State got together to instigate the Rupununi uprising. President Leoni, who had not yet been inaugurated, was not apprised of these plans. Significantly, one of the planes used in the operation belonged to Bolivar State. It was impounded by the Brazilian Government after it landed on Brazilian territory, and the Brazilian Government declared that it would not release it until it knew the intentions of the new Venezuelan Government.

Thirty-six years later, on 13 March 2005, the Caracas daily, Ultimas Noticias, carried an article by Diaz Rangel who mentioned that the AD administration in 1968 gave support to the separatist movement in the Rupununi. The article revealed that "military troops and the police force, apparently commanded by General Yépez Daga, were ready to back the Amerindian separatist movement in the Essequibo which failed. Assault troops and paratroops were left waiting."

P. RAMPHAL'S LETTER TO GUYANA'S MISSION TO THE UN

The CLASC letter to the UN Secretary General apparently raised some concerns within the Guyana Government since it urged the UN to investigate the situation in the Rupununi. With concerns that this could involve a visit by the UN Human Rights Commission, Guyana's Attorney General and Minister of State, in a letter of 13 February to the Ann Jardim, the Charge d'Affaires at the country's Permanent Mission to the UN, said that Guyana should be cautious of inviting the UN Human Rights Commission to visit Guyana. He explained that there were dangers in any such offer particularly since it would be difficult to resist a proposal from, for example, a Latin American country on the Commission to send an investigating committee in response to any such offer.

Ramphal insisted that he would be unhappy over such a visit because it was possible that Venezuela could ensure that rehearsed complaints were advanced by Amerindians. In addition, he believed that an investigating committed from the UN Human Rights Commission would attract unfavourable notice for Guyana and, whatever its final report, he was certain that Venezuela would make much mileage out of it. Further, according to Ramphal, matters could be made worse since the political opposition might make efforts to embarrass the Government during the proceedings.

Q. GUYANA'S RESPONSE TO THE CLASC LETTER

On 13 February 1969, Jardim, (Charge d'Affaires at Guyana's Permanent Mission to the UN), responded to the CLASC letter of 14 January 14, 1969, in the following communication to Secretary General U Thant:

Excellency,

The letter of January 14, 1969, emanating from Caracas and signed on behalf of the Confederacion Latino Americana Syndical Cristiana (CLASC) forwarded with Your Excellency's note of 8th February, 1969, hereafter referred to as "the CLASC letter", is consistent with the efforts currently being made by the Government of Venezuela to conceal its most recent interference in the internal affairs of Guyana behind a facade of distortions and fabrications.

Venezuela's efforts at subversion within Guyana and aggression against Guyana are designed to advance her frenzied territorial ambitions and the false allegations already made by the Venezuelan authorities, and now repeated to Your Excellency for the attention of the Human Rights Commission, are intended to provide a pretext for further Venezuelan acts of subversion and aggression against Guyana. Presented in terms of humanitarian concern for the Amerindian people of Guyana the recital represents merely another stage in the shameful campaign by the wealthiest State in Latin America to plunder more than one-half of the territory of one of the newest and smallest States of the hemisphere, and to do so within the first years of the new State's independence while she is pre-occupied with the essential tasks of development and of social and economic change.

The events in the Rupununi region of Guyana to which the CLASC letter refers have already been the subject of a separate report by the Government of Guyana to Your Excellency, a report which at the request of the Government of Guyana was circulated to the Permanent Missions of all Member States of the United Nations in Your Excellency's Note No. PO 220 VENE(2) of January 10, 1969. A copy of that report is enclosed herewith and the Government of Guyana wishes its contents to be regarded as incorporated in this reply.

The incidents referred to were not, as stated in the CLASC letter, a "popular uprising". There were, as the report to Your Excellency indicated, a series of attacks on Government outposts by a group of wealthy ranchers trained, armed and supplied by the Government of Venezuela. The attacks resulted in the destruction of property and seven persons, including members of the Guyana Police Force and Amerindian citizens, were killed by the attackers. The principal insurgents have since fled Guyana and the majority of them have received both asylum and succour from the Venezuelan authorities.

Contrary also to the statement made in the CLASC letter there has been no retaliation by the Government or any agency of the Government of Guyana against the Amerindian people of the area most of whom had nothing to do with the violence, who fled in the wake of the attacks by the ranchers and who have returned to their peaceful pursuits in the region with the restoration of normal conditions. In fact, the only acts of violence involving either in injury to persons or in death have been those of the ranchers themselves perpetrated with the arms and equipment supplied to them by the Venezuelan Government.

The letter from CLASC alleges that thousands of the Amerindian people are members of the Guyana National Confederation of Workers and Peasants, which it claims as an affiliate, and in its final paragraph the organisation purports to speak "in the name of all the workers of Guyana". A trade union called "The Guyana National Confederation of Workers and Peasants" was registered in Guyana in 1964 but it has never become active, has no known membership and has never complied with the requirements of the law regarding filing of annual returns. The Guyana Trades Union Council, which is an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of its regional organisation the Inter-American Regional Organisation of Workers (ORIT) and its sub-regional group the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL), represents the great majority of the trade unions operating in Guyana and is the only organisation which can speak in the name of the workers of Guyana. The Guyana Trades Union Council has repeatedly condemned Venezuelan acts of hostility and aggression and of interference in Guyana's internal affairs.

Having regard to the current attempt by Venezuela to disguise her territorial ambitions by a feigned humanitarian concern for the people of Guyana, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a public statement made by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Georgetown, Revd. Richard Lester Guilly, S.J. on his return from the 39th International Eucharistic Congress in Bogota and the Conference of Bishops which followed it. The statement was made on September 10, 1968, and reveals some of the Venezuelan attempts at subversion among the Amerindian people of Guyana.

The Amerindian people of Guyana share in full and equal measure the constitutional guarantees enjoyed by all the citizens of Guyana. In addition, however, the Constitution of Guyana imposes and the Government acknowledges special responsibilities for Amerindian affairs designed to advance the welfare of Amerindian people. These responsibilities are discharged with serious regard by the Government of Guyana within the limits of the country's resources-resources, however, which must inevitably he diverted from development to defence as Venezuelan militarism and subversion become more threatening. In general, in terms of respect for their fundamental human rights Guyana's Amerindian people take second place to the Amerindian people of no other State of Latin America. In particular, they are subject to no discrimination in any area of Guyana's national life.

It is the view of the Government of Guyana that the Human Rights Commission should take no cognizance of the CLASC letter of January 14, 1969. If, however, this letter or any of the allegations it makes is to be discussed by the Commission, it is the wish of the Government of Guyana that it be invited to participate in such proceedings of the Commission and the Government of Guyana will be grateful for this wish to be communicated to the Commission. . .

R. ALLEGED ATROCITIES IN THE RUPUNUNI

After the uprising was crushed, claims were made by numerous Guyanese, including some Rupununi Amerindians, that particularly in the northern savannahs the security forces had harassed, and even killed, a large number of Amerindians in putting down the revolt and in their subsequent "mopping up" operations which continued weeks after the revolt ended. Actually, many Amerindians were so fearful of the security forces that they fled over the border to seek refuge in Brazil. The allegation of harassment and killings was subsequently denied by the Guyana Government and the administration of the Guyana Defence Force, both of which claimed that no one was killed in the suppression of the rebels.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Georgetown, the Reverend R. Lester Guilly, was allowed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to make a four day observation tour of the southern Rupununi Savannahs to see the condition of the Amerindians, most of whom were Roman Catholics. However, he was not allowed to visit the northern Rupununi where the rebellion actually took place. On his return to Georgetown, he reported that at St. Ignatius and Macusi Village (both located near Lethem) the Amerindians were still nervous and that a number of them had fled across the border to Brazil. He said that the old school building was burned to the ground, but little damage was done to the newer school building.

Despite the fact that Bishop Guilly did not actually visit the areas where there were military activities, he concluded: "I am happy to say that I am quite satisfied that there have been no atrocities."

However, the Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, who had applied to the Government to visit the Rupununi District, which was now designated a restricted area to non Amerindians, was refused permission by the Ministry of Home Affairs to visit the area to examine the situation. As a result of this refusal, the PPP sent two of its leading Amerindian members, Eugene Stoby, a Member of Parliament, and Basil James to the Rupununi by the Guyana Airways passenger flight to make on the spot observations. But on landing at the Lethem airfield, they were detained by the GDF authorities and sent back on the return flight to Georgetown where they were rigorously questioned by the police before being released.

S. VIEWS OF THE PPP ON THE SITUATION

Based on the refusal by the Government to allow Dr. Jagan and the two PPP Amerindian members from going to the Rupununi, the party expressed the view that the Government had something to hide and that, most likely, some Amerindians had been killed by the GDF in the suppression of the rebellion. The PPP felt that the Government's statement that no Amerindian was killed in the crushing of the rebellion was untrue since it was apparent that the army met resistance which caused it to burn down a number of buildings in which mainly Amerindian rebels had entrenched themselves. It would be unique, the PPP stated, for an army to crush an armed rebellion without inflicting any loss of life on the rebel forces.

In the July September 1969 issue of Thunder, the theoretical journal of the PPP, Dr. Jagan in an article entitled "What the future holds for Guyana", wrote:

. . . The Government, having ruthlessly crushed the rebellion . . . is moving to militarize our politics. Incessant calls are being made for greater sacrifices to build a bigger army and police so "that our nation can be protected".

The revolt had its origin in a combination of factors-resentment by the people of the Rupununi against the PNC Government for the electoral fraud and the eviction of the United Force from the coalition; dissatisfaction with the Government's high handed action in connection with their leased lands; subversion by Venezuela in its quest for a Guyanese "fifth column".

Venezuela's claim to nearly three fifths of our territory was part of the Anglo American conspiracy. It was resurrected in 1962 to be used as an aggressive weapon against the PPP or any future progressive regime in an independent Guyana. . .

During the past four years this claim was used for jingoistic and diversionary purposes in support of US puppet regimes in both Guyana and Venezuela. In the 1968 election, it served as an intimidatory weapon. The PNC, with its main electoral slogan, "peace not conflict", openly suggested the threat of Venezuelan aggression in case of a PPP victory.

These were the reasons for the failure of the PNC UF coalition to take to the UN Security Council Venezuela's aggression (occupation of the whole of Ankoko Island), threat of aggression (Venezuela's edict authorising its Navy to patrol Guyana's offshore waters), and subversion. The USA, while not wishing to be placed in a position of deciding between Guyana's "right" and Venezuela's "might", wants at the same time the Venezuelan claim to remain open indefinitely.

Indeed, there is every likelihood that the USA either backed or connived at Venezuelan support (military training and refuge) for the Rupununi rebels. This is just one way in which the United States not only expressed disapproval of the expulsion of the pro capitalist imperialist UF from the Government, but also intends to keep the PNC regime in line politically. . .

T. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

During early February 1969, the PNC Government rushed a National Security Act through the National Assembly in the face of strong opposition from the PPP. The Government claimed that the Act was aimed at curbing subversion in the country. In the October December 1969 issue of Thunder, under the article, "The Erosion of Civil Liberties", a leading Executive Member of the PPP, Ranji Chandisingh (who later defected to the PNC in 1976) commented on this Act and the aftermath of the Rupununi revolt:

During the debate in Parliament (on the National Security Act of 1969 to restrict the movement of persons within Guyana and to prevent Guyanese leaving the country), Opposition members pointed out that in the vast Rupununi area-following the short lived uprising-the Government imposed administratively a complete ban on persons entering the area. The charge was made that the Government had something to hide; it was not telling the whole truth about the situation in the Rupununi-particularly with respect to the treatment of the Amerindians. There was much speculation as to the number of deaths.

The PPP sent two of its Amerindian members-one an organiser, the other a Member of Parliament-to investigate. They bought airplane tickets from the Guyana Airways Corporation and duly boarded the plane. Shortly after they landed, however, they were rounded up by police and sent back to Georgetown. Even priests who had served in the area were hustled out and prevented from returning. The Government had actually sealed off the entire area, long after there could be any military justification for this. Only Government officials and certain PNC activists were allowed in.

At that time the Government was acting without any legal or constitutional authority. It was only subsequently that the Government-through this Act (National Security Act, 1969)-gave itself legal authority for such action.

Shortly after the National Security Act was passed, a Defence Levy tax of three percent on imported goods was imposed. The aim of this new tax, according to the Government, was to raise revenue to strengthen Guyana's defence capabilities.

U. AMERINDIAN CONFERENCE

Nearly two months after the Rupununi uprising, Prime Minister Burnham invited all Amerindian Touchaus (Chiefs) to Georgetown for a four day conference, from the 28 February to the 3 March 1969, ostensibly aimed at formulating a far reaching programme of Amerindian development. At the end of the conference, the Amerindian chiefs, in condemning the Rupununi revolt, passed the following resolution:

Acknowledging our duties to the State of Guyana and prepared to share also with our brothers in Guyana responsibilities for the development and the defence of Guyana;

Concerned over the claims of Venezuela to that part of Guyana in which many of us live in peace and harmony with the other people of Guyana-hereby declare that we

1. Pledge our whole hearted loyalty to the Government of Guyana which we consider our only Government;

2. Reject the unjust claims of Venezuela to any part of the territory of Guyana;

3. Deplore the action of those misguided persons who conspire with foreigners to the detriment of our State;

4. Condemn all persons who seek to overthrow by force the lawful authority of the Government of Guyana;

5. Call upon all Guyanese to resist by all means any attempt by Venezuela or any other State to take or gain control of any part of Guyana;

6. Inform all nations of the world that we will never agree to the destruction or division of our country or recognise the claim of Venezuela or any other nation to any of the territory of Guyana.

V. RUPUNUNI REVOLT REPORTED TO THE UN

As part of its diplomatic offensive, Guyana used the forum of the 24th session of the UN General Assembly to highlight the failed insurrection. In the general debate on 6 October 1969, Guyana's Attorney General and Minister of External Affairs, Shridath Ramphal, informed the delegates of the Venezuelan involvement in the Rupununi revolt. Of special interest was his statement that the leaders of the revolt were ranchers, "many of whom were not even citizens of Guyana", and all of whom resented the authority of the PNC Government.

On the following day, the Permanent Representative of Venezuela, claiming the right to reply, accused Guyana of using the UN to propagate its internal policies by bringing charges of "invented aggression by Venezuela" before that body. He claimed that the Guyana Government was attempting to draw attention away from the troubled racial situation-left by British imperialism-and from the economic problems facing the country at home. He added that Venezuela was justified in warning foreign companies that their land rights granted by Guyana might not apply when the disputed territory should become "part of Venezuela".

Then on the 8 October, Guyana's Permanent Representative to the UN, Patterson Thompson, in a rebuttal, admitted that Guyana had its share of economic and social problems. But, he said, for Venezuela to attempt to present these matters as a reason for Guyana's justified complaints in the General Assembly against Venezuelan hostility, was to seek the flimsiest pretext for inhibiting discussion in the General Assembly and to divert attention from the real motives underlying that hostility.

W. THE AFTERMATH

Meanwhile, towards the end of the year, the trial of the ten men charged with the murder of the five policemen and two civilians during the uprising began in the Supreme Court in Georgetown. In its case, the prosecution alleged that the men conspired to take over the Rupununi from the administration of the Central Government. Evidence was also introduced to show Venezuela's implication in the rebellion in providing training and arms for the insurrectionists and giving direction to their activities.

On the other hand, the defence urged the jury to return a "not guilty" verdict since the men took part in the uprising under duress because they were afraid for their lives. Finally on 16 January 1970, after both sides had presented their concluding arguments, the jury retired to consider their verdict. After deliberating for over seven hours, they arrived at their verdict shortly before midnight. They acquitted Ignatius Charlie, Anaclito Alicio, Handel Singh, Francis James, Charles Davis, Damian Phillips, and Brenton Singh. However, they failed to agree on a verdict in respect of Colin Melville, Aldwyn Singh, and Patrick Melville. The judge ordered a retrial for these three, but shortly after, the Director of Public Prosecutions dropped all charges against them.

X. MIXED COMMISSION MEETINGS

Ironically, a meeting of the Guyana-Venezuela Mixed Commission had just been completed in Caracas just a few days before the plans for the Rupununi uprising and the training of the rebels were finalised with the complicity of the Venezuelan authorities. Subsequently, other meetings of the Mixed Commission were held during 1969 in Barbados in April and in Antigua in June. The Antigua meeting was followed quickly by another in Mexico during the same month. The Commission met again at the end of September in Trinidad and Tobago.

Y. CLOSURE OF MANGANESE MINING IN GUYANA

Significantly, it was around this time that the manganese mining company in the North West District (in western Essequibo) closed down its operations. The company which operated at Matthews Ridge for many years was a subsidiary of the giant US corporation, Union Carbide. The company claimed that it closed its operations because it was incurring great financial losses. However, despite the fact that manganese prices on the world market were very favourable, the Guyana Government accepted the excuse from the company and allowed the closure.

The PPP in a statement insisted that the company closed operations because of pressure from Venezuela. The parent body in the USA had larger concessions in Venezuela in the mining of manganese and iron ore and, according to the PPP, it was politically more feasible to continue working there than in Guyana.

It was not until twelve years after, in 1981, when Venezuela renewed its agitation to press its claim to western Essequibo did the PNC Government finally agree with the statement by the PPP.

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